



Nahuel
Moreno

**Oral report to
the expanded
CC of the
Peruvian PST**



Nahuel Moreno

Oral report to the expanded CC of the Peruvian PST

4 April 1980
(Taken from party archives)

English translation: Daniel Iglesias

Cover and interior design: Daniel Iglesias

www.nahuelmoreno.org

www.uit-ci.org

www.izquierdasocialista.org.ar

Copyright by *CEHUS*, Centro de Estudios Humanos y Sociales
Buenos Aires, 2018
cehus2014@gmail.com



Índice

Oral report to the expanded CC of the Peruvian PST

Introduction.....	1
1. In Peru and Bolivia, we can already build revolutionary parties with mass influence.....	2
2. The problems we have seen from outside	5
The telephone appointment.....	5
Expenses and the balance sheet	6
The newspaper	6
The party premises.....	6
3. The problems I see now I am here.....	7
The triumphalism	7
The committees and the national situation	8
The culture of poverty	9
Number of militants.....	10
4. The internal regime: Bonapartism versus Bolshevism.....	11
Nothing outside the organisms	11
Written Analysis and perspectives	12
Political successes and party structure.....	13
A respected national leadership	14
Let's organise the party from its leadership	15

Addendum

Contribution from a letter to E.....	17
---	-----------

Oral report to the expanded CC of the Peruvian PST

Introduction

Comrades:

We, members of the National Directorate, who have been absent from the country for some time, have requested this meeting to exchange ideas about the situation of the party since, superficially, apparently, we saw a series of discouraging symptoms.

We discussed quite a lot with the other comrades of the Directorate about the nature of this meeting; whether it would be a common Central Committee, with a common agenda for reporting and discussing the international situation, Latin American and national, a report from activities and perspectives, and the plan of activities for the immediate future. But we concluded we had to start at the beginning.

We see negative symptoms in the life of the party; I insist again: as appearance. It would be a pedantry on our part to believe, just reincorporated, we dominate the situation of the Peruvian party, or that based on some small symptoms we can define it, specify its policy, etc. We know in advance our abstract analysis is superficial; it is seen from the outside. We must all be aware of these limitations, as shown by the Marxist method, so what we say from now on can be useful, and help the discussion.

Everything I say, a 30, a 40, a 50, or an 80 percent will be wrong. A high percentage of misunderstandings must exist, but the truth will emerge from the discussion. We want to provoke this discussion. To date, only God and Posadas were always right, from wherever in the world they were. The Trotskyists have extended this panorama to Thornett too, not even from London, but from a tiny city in England, he is always right (Laughter). We do not have such luck. We are humans. This trilogy of God, Posadas, and Thornett do not exist in our current, so take into account this warning: we do not have a magic wand or we get it right from afar. As anyone from afar, we inevitably make mistakes, and when we are right our successes are relative.

Having made this clear, I want to add something else: amongst Bolsheviks it is good to exaggerate the differences when a discussion begins, to originate a controversy, a rich dialogue. Otherwise, it is not a dialogue. We must try to get two poles discussing. And the truth will come out of the discussion and not from one of the poles. Thus, I will fulfil the role of negative, bad, devil pole. I will play the negative role, the bad guy in the movie. I will be the good guy. We have already divided the tasks last night; we have said how we will act. Then you have to know these are roles. You know psychology advanced a lot when the psychology of small groups was discovered, what was called psychodrama, i.e., where

different roles had to be fulfilled. Well, we will do trotskodrama; F will be the good guy and I will be the bad guy in this movie.

1. In Peru and Bolivia, we can already build revolutionary parties with mass influence

We attach great importance to Peru and Bolivia. It is the centre of activities of the current and we believe also of the Fourth International. This was said in passing at the Second World Conference of the current. (F was not present throughout the meeting and his report touched only a small, limited and wrong aspect). Where the problem of Peru and Bolivia was solved, was in a very reserved, very closed meeting of the current direction. We believe both in Peru and in Bolivia, the conditions are set so in three or five years, give or take, to build the first Bolshevik Trotskyist parties of masses. This opportunity which has only been presented exceptionally since the Fourth International was founded — like Bolivia, when in the 1940s and 1950s the Trotskyists had the possibility of achieving a mass revolutionary party — we believe now it begins to be a true perspective.

Perhaps the most important resolution of the Current meeting was an apparently a bit abstract, theoretical resolution, saying we can build revolutionary parties with mass influence. We can do it in Latin America. Later, this was fine tuned in that closed, small meeting. And we concluded it was not so in Central America. That in Central America we had dams, very large walls, to have the certainty, the assuredness we could build mass parties in two, three, four, or five years.

In El Salvador, we believe the importance of the guerrilla fronts and the lack of Trotskyist tradition — despite the existence of a magnificent sister group, completely working class, fighter, very self-denying, with a certain influence in the workers' movement — will lead the mass organisms to be transformed into guerrilla organisations.

In Nicaragua, when the operation of the Simon Bolívar Brigade was frustrated, in the absence of a solid Trotskyist organisation linked to our current, this situation allowed the FSLN to take over the entire mass movement. We believe if in Nicaragua we had had a party of 100 well-organised militants three years ago, today we would have a mass party which would have merged with the Simon Bolívar Brigade. But in Nicaragua there was a group linked to us but very independent, the Marxist Revolutionary League, very, very sectarian; one of those Trotskyist variations of very capable comrades, as in Ecuador, but maniacs for purity, who always have cabalistic numbers, sacred numbers. In Ecuador, I do not know whether 11 or 12 was the sacred number. As soon as they recruit three they let go two because they do not want to ever go over 12 or 13 in number. In Nicaragua the number was 15. As soon as they reached 16 they let one go, in case they exceed the number 15. Hard sectarians, and very capable, both in Ecuador and Nicaragua. In such conditions, it is much more difficult to achieve a Trotskyist party of masses because now we have to overcome the FSLN's barrier. We will have to wait for a whole stage which will last one, two, three, or four years until the FSLN enters into a crisis and also, to a certain extent, the Maoist current of the Workers' Front.

Instead, in Peru and Bolivia we see a completely different situation to El Salvador and Nicaragua, exceptional conditions. First, they are in the Southern Cone. The Southern Cone forms a unit. You have to live a while in Colombia to realise that the Southern Cone forms a unit. That is, there are many communicating vessels from country to country: between Brazil and Argentina, Argentina and Bolivia, Peru and Argentina, Chile and Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil, than between Colombia and

Venezuela. The Brazilian comrades are closely linked to the Bolivians, not so much to Peru; Bolivia and Chile. Chile has had a lot of ties with the Peruvian and Bolivian revolutionary process. That is, there are many more communicating vessels than there are between Colombia, for example, and the Central American countries; Venezuela the same. There is a little bond between the Colombians and the Venezuelans despite everything that unites them: the historical process, common national heroes, common battles, and the struggle for common independence. However, today there are quite pronounced differences and few communicating vessels.

The same happens with Colombia and Ecuador, possibly because there has not been a revolutionary process in common. Instead, the entire Southern Cone has a great Trotskyist tradition. Wrong, with mistakes, with defeats, but it is part of the national tradition. Trotskyism in Bolivia is part of the national tradition. There have been thousands and thousands of Trotskyists in Bolivia. In Peru too. In Peru, the Trotskyist is part of the national tradition, unlike Colombia, unlike Venezuela, unlike the Central American countries, where it is just coming in. In Colombia, the works of Trotsky just arrived 10, 11, or 12 months ago. For the first time the works of Trotsky! At the University, it began to be known Trotsky existed.

The same phenomenon takes place in Central America, possibly not so much in Honduras and Guatemala. In Mexico, a country with a low political and theoretical level, there is a certain weak Trotskyist tradition. In contrast, in the Southern Cone, specifically in Peru and Bolivia, there is a Trotskyist tradition, as in Argentina, as in Uruguay, as in Chile; for better or for worse, but it exists. It is not a rare or mysterious animal, on the one hand. On the other hand, there is an extraordinary rise of the masses, both in Peru and in Bolivia; a rise of the masses we do see with no immediate possibility of being defeated. There will be ebbs and flows, there will be hits from the bourgeoisie, but we do not see the possibility of an immediate historical defeat. The situation will continue, the fight will continue, with ups and downs. We do not see the possibility of a stabilisation of the situation of the bourgeoisie based on a defeat in Peru and Bolivia. On the contrary, we see the possibility of extending the revolutionary rise to Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, that it extends throughout the Southern Cone.

Within the Southern Cone, the two crucial points — we insist — are Peru and Bolivia. Peru also, with an already Trotskyist current of masses, which actually is the current that follows Hugo Blanco; and in Bolivia, beginning this Trotskyist mass movement, perhaps with more structural solidity than here. The differences must be specified, because at the meeting of the current there appeared a union leader of 90,000 peasants in Oruro who has a broadcaster, armed militias and who are the ones who stopped all of Bolivia, closing all roads when the last coup took place. The comrade reported their radio call was heeded throughout Bolivia, not just in Oruro. He is a young comrade who reflects this new leadership that evicted the bureaucratic leadership and who has joined our party. This has to do with this Trotskyist tradition. Not only did he join our party because of the influence this may have — since he is very young, very student — but because of this tradition that is part of the experience of the education of the proletariat and the Bolivian peasantry. In this sense, the Bolivian comrades (who are much less than you in terms of tradition, political level, freshly made, very young) appeared, with this striking fact of a leader, a secretary of a union of 90,000 perfectly organised people, with pickets, who have already made revolutionary actions that have paralysed Bolivia completely and who are very strong. We want to see what this means. We want to see also whether an electoral pole can be made there.

And here in Peru, we have this large electoral mass current that Hugo Blanco means and which is also part of our tradition and our tendency. Because Hugo Blanco is great, his prestige is enormous due to a policy, which was to recognise in the early 1960s and at the end of the 1950s, that we had begun a process of peasant organisation and struggles. That was seen only by our tendency, which today forms our ideological orientation of the PST (A).

Then, we have very good situations in Bolivia and Peru. There are no consolidated reformist-opportunist apparatuses yet. There is a crisis of Maoism, there is a crisis of Stalinism, they are not strong; they are not growing much. If there is something likely to grow, it is Trotskyism, if we have a correct policy and do not go back to doing the same disasters we did in the other two great waves of uprise. This is why we believe there are exceptional circumstances in both Peru and Bolivia, unlike Central America. In Central America the revolutionary rise is greater than here, especially in El Salvador, but the difference is the subjective factor, the party factor. There is no current in El Salvador, Hugo Blanco type. There are not thousands and thousands of workers who claim, even for sentimental reasons, a revolutionary Trotskyist solution, political class independence. In Peru, there is. In El Salvador, there is no union of 90,000 members which is for a Trotskyist policy or which has weapons or anything suchlike. This is the fundamental difference that for us exists between Peru and Bolivia and the rest of the Latin American countries where there is a great revolutionary rise, as in Central America. This is what makes the situation in Peru and Bolivia exceptional.

And it also made it exceptional — it made it, that is, past tense, because now we have to change a bit — the impression we had from the reports you had 400 or 500 militants. The Argentine party entered Lanusse's electoral process with 400 militants and became the largest Trotskyist party of the Fourth International, and it continues to be so. A party which used the electoral process to the end, without the rise and with the enormous influence of Peronism. Take into account that about 98 out of every 100 Argentine workers were Peronists. In the entire Argentine population Peronism drew 70 and 75 percent of the votes. Of 10 Argentines, seven or seven and a half were Peronists. Of those, among the workers, 98 out of 100 were rabid Peronists.

Despite this, our party — it is about the years I lived in Argentina — became great using the strip we could, with another huge inconvenience: the revolutionary rise in our country took place in the provinces and not in Buenos Aires. And in the province of Córdoba, because of the breakup with the guerrillas, our party was very weak. It ended up being very strong, but it started off very weak after the Cordobazo. While in Buenos Aires the PST (A) directed the classist movement, in Córdoba it was a tremendous struggle and it could not lead. After a long time we managed to win Paez, one of the class leaders. Despite all the inconveniences, it achieved 70,000 votes in the first election and 200,000 in the second, with 400 militants, and we managed to make a party of 3000 or 3500 solid, well-structured militants.

In Buenos Aires alone, almost 50 large party premises were achieved. When we say premises, we do not say houses with a few feet to the front, but premises like this, bigger than this one. So, we managed 40 plus such premises. And later, we reduced the premises because they were attacked and what not, and we were left with 23, I think. The comrades can rectify me if I am confused.

Now we see a perspective five or ten times better than the one we had in Argentina. We said: here we are with the same party and with a situation a thousand times better in Peru than in Argentina: there is no Peronism in Peru, the left is divided, no one controls the workers' movement, nor is there classism controlling it. Having all this against in Argentina and using the electoral process, nothing else than using the electoral process, we scratched that two percent, we achieved that two percent of the population, the two percent that left the Peronism within the workers' movement to come for the Trotskyist solution. They took blood out of the stone. Not only that, when the coup came, it is estimated that two percent according to bourgeois calculations in Argentina had already transformed into four to eight percent, that is, from ½ million to one million votes shown on the elections. All this by fighting against Peronism; you need to know what Peronism was. It's a terrible thing; you had to fight man to man. Then, however, with the defence of the party premises, with that fight, we advanced.

I remember a loose person in the south, who was approaching us on all fours; we grabbed him and visited him. This is how a loose station arose out there, in Patagonia, I do

not remember which one, where we got many votes, so we managed to get it in a small town in Patagonia... before arriving in Bariloche and the PST being a serious option, I believe the leader was a woman. Well, we fought man to man. Thanks to the organisation, those 400 militants acted as soldiers. This has been a characteristic of the Argentine party. Amid Mandelism fight against us, in 1969, when they take away our recognition, Comrade Livio Maitan says ours is the most organised party of the Fourth International.

2. The problems we have seen from outside

Well, then, we said, it is a party similar to the Argentine when legality was opened, with much more favourable conditions. Up to here, everything positive. Let's see why we voted to turn to Peru and Bolivia. Before coming, we began to notice some slightly alarming symptoms for us who are hysterical, organisational, maniacs (many years ago, Comrade Jack Barnes said we were hysterical and we have accepted this definition; it is the only point where we agree with the SWP leadership). We are hysterical, maniacs of Trotskyism and Trotskyist organisations today. Then, to us, hysterical — it almost certainly should not matter, it must be an ultra-secondary phenomenon — we were very worried about a vulgar telephone appointment. And the leadership of the Argentine party was worried too. I will tell you that anecdote because from there our concerns began with you. You will say surely it is an unimportant problem; you will be with the good man of this cowboy movie, the one wearing the white hat, which I make it clear is F; I'm the one wearing a black hat and black boots, like the bad cowboys, the movie villains.

The telephone appointment

You tell us that on Sunday night you will know whether you have to buy a video-cassette, and it is very important for the electoral campaign, so we have to speak without fail on Sunday at 9 o'clock at night. Then we, hysterical-crazed maniacs, at 7 am on Sunday we call our Comrade C, who works in the Bogotá telephone company. We woke her up and told her that an operation had to be prepared for 9:05 pm sharp because there was a transcendental call. In turn, Comrade CI since Thursday or Friday, supported by the newspaper comrades and from the party premises, was seeking a journalist's accreditation, to get 10 video-cassettes through customs, claiming it was a tool of work. Well, we woke C up and told her to go see what comrade friend of hers worked that night to guarantee the call. As the comrade said she was not sure whether she would find her friends, part of the political bureau of the Colombian party tracked other people who worked on the phone company.

After hours of work, we had four telephone operators hooked in case one failed. The issue was life or death. Conclusion: 9:05, the call is made. You do not answer. But it cannot be! Please insist again, 9:10, new call, no answer. 9:20, third call and you do not answer. We were stunned. All this apparatus, about ten people have worked day and night for the accreditation and for the telephone call. The Argentine leaders who were there look at me stunned. We said: "Did M go crazy?", thinking that it was M. Then the Argentine leaders say: we have to expel her. This we do not allow. We are going to ask for the expulsion of Comrade M. She can't do this to us. So now M became irresponsible? We are very sorry, we love her very much, but we vote the same as we did with Ernesto when we suspended him for a year, in the old fashioned way of the Argentine party.

Expenses and the balance sheet

The other detail that worried me is the expenses of the party. I knew you were asking for money from all the old militants who were abroad. Here is the memorandum of the telephone conversation M held with F, on Sunday the 23rd. It is an official report. Then I ask the comrades: show us how much money there is because you are asking us... I get a form, I look at it and we get scared. What's going on in Peru? M has gone crazy, or something strange is happening. You afford the luxury of telling us a telephone call is essential and you are not on the phone at the time of the appointment. You ask us for money and look at these accounts. It seems Peru does not know what it is doing.

Let's see: past loans, US\$ 10,000; November loans, US\$ 5,000. Loan to 13 January 1980: US\$ 4,280. Detail: US\$ 2,800 in cash, US\$ 1,880 in *Correspondencia Internacional* which has not been taken up, so it's not your fault and US\$ 300 for the conference expenses. US\$ 4.289. Return tickets for delegates to the conference: US\$ 646, tickets for C, N, J: US\$ 1,400 dollars, ticket for M, US\$ 300, ticket for A, difference: US\$ 332, ticket for B, difference: US\$ 116. Departure permits from the airport, paperwork, etc.: US\$ 180. Travel for T: US\$ 465. Video-cassette: US\$ 580, operation T: US\$ 880. All this adds up to US\$ 23,579.

To this is added the debt you hold for publications of the current and that we have asked for a payment plan at least three times. US\$ 1850. In total you owe us US\$ 25,000. You also owe us US\$ 15,000 from the printing press, which they claim every day and we'll have to pay for it. That is, US\$ 25,000 plus US\$ 15,000: US\$ 40,000. An exceptional situation.

We have a sacred principle in our current, which, if we do not respect it, we fall into paternalism. Every party pays its debts. We help Camilo's party a lot. But it pays all debts and today is the one that helps the current. M has put this many times in doubt, and he is right because sometimes they have been a bit irregular, but I can report they do. They help religiously, falling behind two or three months, and then they catch up. Everyone helps: Mexico, Spain, Portugal (although it is very weak), France, Brazil has helped a lot but now it is very irregular.

The newspaper

You had a very bad newspaper. I do not want to use the strong expression I know P liked it a lot and which I used the other day in the very strong discussion. It is a newspaper, to put it in very delicate terms, weak; the weakest of the current. Despite this US\$ 40,000, you put out a weak newspaper. This also worried us.

The party premises

We have helped a lot for you to have a great venue. This is fundamental. We have said: anything is fine, all the disasters you do are fine, but all that money we send you, we old Peruvian militants with the sacrifices we have made abroad, is for you to have great headquarters. If you are against, you have to tell us. If the money which will come from the other comrades who have not yet returned will not be for the premises, you have to tell us: the money is not for the premises. So we tell you because the current has a mania: do the experience, but let us do ours. There is no electoral campaign (or useful legal work) without large premises. It was a great fight in Spain. The comrades had two small, little rooms.

As soon as the [Political] Bureau met in one room, there were no more party meetings. Then the current came and said: you do not believe in a great venue, very well. Let us do the experience. And we leased in the centre of Madrid a huge, beautiful place. They told us: you are Americans; you believe everything is done in a big way. After a fortnight they said it was small. They were filled with people. I wouldn't be convinced by anyone that for G, or the comrades in laboratories, it would not suit them greatly if we had a place with 15 or 20 large rooms and we give them one, with a good desk, two or three phones, and say: come all

the time, come every day when you leave work, this room is for you. Without huge premises there is no legal work. And it has to be in the political-commercial centre of the countries, not anywhere. Then it creates a habit, you become accustomed to it.

One reason efficiency is reduced by half or a quarter is that you do not have a venue, with two, three, or four telephones and a telephone operator connecting, calling to the interior. We have to put the technical methods at our service. The telephone is a great invention, immense. We have to do a course on the invention of the telephone in the party (laughs). Let's leave the smoke signals; they are very positive for cowboy movies but outdated.

We have been constantly asking you: "Do you lease the premises? Here goes the money." When we found out you still did not have it, we began to worry about the whole problem. Could F be replacing the leadership? Could it be we do not have a coherent leadership? We visited scared, furious with M, and very concerned about these partial symptoms.

Well, and I arrived here. The first, as soon as I wanted to yell at M, she stopped me with two or three shouts, saying: "I had nothing to do with it, I did not have to attend the telephone call." And the good guy from the movie, F, appeared, and I found the problem of the comrades' accommodation. Besides the four negative elements I had seen in Bogotá, others were added. Among them: we still do not have premises.

3. The problems I see now I am here

The first thing I want to point out is the problem of accommodation and expenses which displays the absolute lack of foresight. Is it okay to ask for comrades who were far away from the country and not have solved the problem of their accommodation? I estimate we have spent US\$ 150 to US\$ 200 per day, adding up all the expenses, for accommodation problems. Well, that's fine, let's say it is US\$ 100 or US\$ 120 per day. In 10 days we have spent, for not having prepared the accommodations, from US\$ 1000 to US\$ 1,200. Every Bolshevik method means that, if comrades are to come, they are told: "do not come until we fix the accommodation." Because it doesn't work. They arrive here and they start looking for a house; it's disorganisation. You spend twice as much; you don't take advantage of the comrade for the party.

We held a meeting in Sao Paulo where 200 people came and we prepared accommodation for the 200 of them, and the host party is a party that is establishing itself. You have to think about the problem of food, whether it is different because the health of the comrades depends on it. We in Sao Pablo thought all that. You here don't, and our comrades got sick.

The triumphalism

If I'm not misinformed — you will rectify me and rectify a myriad of questions showing me how my analysis is negative — at the end of the rally held this month in Lima where the three Trotskyist organisations took part, 300 or 400 comrades left in our column. You painted this as an extraordinary success while of Hugo Blanco and POMR [Revolutionary Marxist Workers Party] — who took by many more people than us — you said to be a disaster the first and disorganised the second.

I had talked with F on the phone; we had a very strong discussion about the possibility of the unitary committee because F said the only ones who could do committees were us. Then I told him if only us would work in this perspective, why would we make a unitary committee? It is creating a farce. Let's do it ourselves but let's not call it unitary. The unitary committee is only justified if the POMR or Hugo Blanco also make committees. That is, they are real processes. I do not want to discuss the tactical question. What I want to point

out is the report: the only ones who can do committees are us. Hundreds and hundreds of committees throughout Peru; Hugo Blanco, nothing. A disaster. Now, I've just chatted with F here and he tells me that Hugo Blanco, in the newspaper, gives instructions on how the committees should be done, that this gives him results, and that they do form committees and they seem to be more than us. They do it fundamentally in the neighbourhoods, it is populist; they do not have our conception of the party. We already know this.

For example, I liked a lot what E just told me: we have to see our negative sides. We have to be pessimistic. Trotsky said Lenin, like Napoleon, was pessimistic, always with doubts until he resolved the issue. We always have to think the others are geniuses, and we are morons. And if we think the game of chess starting from the other is genius and I am a moron, but nevertheless, despite him being a genius with this move I win, we can never lose. Now if the other is a moron and I'm the genius, as soon as I'm careless, he always defeats me. It is elementary, Marxist logic. One has to be pessimistic. A thorough historical optimist, but one doesn't have to think everything is perfect, because then one does not think about the negative aspects, the obstacles, the inconveniences. And I find that the base of the act was driven by Hugo Blanco; we only brought 300 or 400, or we may have brought 500. Bringing 500 is nothing.

The Colombian party, without a rise, without anything, brings 1200 or 1500 to a demonstration. They bring four or five times more than you do, and there is no rise. Lima is a city a little bigger than Bogota; it has 500,000 or one million inhabitants more than Bogota. You need to see what the Colombian proletariat is. You need to see it. The merit of the Colombian party is great. If they were from the Pampas, they bring them with gas (laughter). There is no political level. When Comrade O was here, he lived surprised by the political level of the Peruvian proletariat. You do not know what Colombia is. However, it is an organised, hard party, with premises and fighting every day to achieve 1200 or 1500 organised and they bring them. And when they bring them they take them out and when they take them out they bring them in. Because here I do not know what mysterious dialectic exists of the give and take. I do not know if it's worth a lot when you take them out, but it's not worth much when you bring them in. I do not know; it's a very strange thing that our dialectic has not reached so far yet. Because we bring in and take out so many: 1200 or 1500. We bring them in and we take them out. Here, we have been told what is very important is what you leave with when the rally ends. It may be a national modality that people do not go to the rally but only leave the rally. It is a dialectic I didn't know.

The committees and the national situation

We don't see the hundreds of committees you say, with that triumphalism that characterises you. We don't see them. But we also don't see the national situation as you describe it, where everything goes against the bourgeoisie and in favour of the proletariat and the revolution. We have great doubts about the triumphalist analysis you do and according to which the only thing that thrives within the bourgeois ranks is division, that there is a great fight between APRA and Belaunde. We have great doubts. When we arrived here this week we read in the press some anecdotal issues that make us doubt. It is impossible for you to be right. That there will be a tremendous mess, the APRA does not get 36 percent, they are divided, and a situation happens as in Bolivia, we reach the brink of civil war. But it gives us the impression that no, that the Peruvian bourgeoisie is much more solid than the Bolivian bourgeoisie, without a new bourgeoisie like the one of Santa Cruz that upsets the entire bourgeois equilibrium. It gives us the impression it is a much more serious thing, more than well discussed with imperialism.

We will not make an analysis based on anecdotes, but the anecdotes must also be explained. We shouldn't say it does not matter. That Mrs Villanueva is crazy, and that Bedolla is crazy or Bedolla got drunk; they are explanations, not very politically convincing but sometimes it happens. There have been Latin American presidents who have spoken under the influence of drunkenness, such as the famous vice-president of Ecuador, etc., etc. But

it is not very common. And what do we find? Bedolla said because of the electoral process they treat each very harshly but the three candidates are very friendly and everything is already arranged electorally. Whoever gets the most votes, even if he does not get 36 percent, has the support of the other two candidates. He said it in a city in the interior. *El Comercio* published it on Wednesday.

Two: the wife of Armando Villanueva makes a statement and says we must not deceive ourselves, on the same day the Bedolla issue shows up. She says that Armando is a very good person, has a reputation for being surly, well, a whole series of things. That they madly love their daughter and what not. None of that matters to get votes, but she says something politically very interesting: that Villanueva and Belaunde are close friends, that the two marriages are very friendly, especially she and Mrs Belaunde and there is no need to worry about political problems; same as Bedolla. That there is total agreement. Have you read it? This week. This matches a report I was given — I did not read it — that there was a meeting of the military high command, and they said: “Political problems here there are none. Everything is fixed.” There are three reports. We have to study the national situation well. We have to objectively study ourselves. We have to study. See well what are our party and our country.

The culture of poverty

There are other issues that concern us; small details that have to do with the culture of poverty, not with a proletarian morality. I talk about the problem of Comrade P, who we see here working like a slave to get the newspaper out, organising the newspaper, having a tremendous toothache. We are talking about misery. That is a partisan problem. Trotsky raised this. I will dwell on this. Trotsky said: when you are in the party health does not belong to you individually, it is a partisan problem. I mean the health of all the comrades, not just the leaders. Otherwise, we would be bureaucrats. Well, I did not see there was much of a concern; I did not see the party putting together a good amount of money as if it were a serious issue and saying “let’s see how we heal him”.

There are other personal problems I have not touched and of which I have been informing myself. Everyone has to be organised. It is not of Bolsheviks not to be organised. Everyone has to have normal homes, normal wives, and normal children. When you go to live in a house you do not have to leave the inside a mess, this is also a proletarian norm.

Here I confirmed there was still no central headquarters. And then I went to a meeting; a meeting where not everyone assisted. I do not know what day the political bureau meets, or the cells. I got the impression it is chaos. But it may not. I got the impression the life of the party does not revolve around organisms. In the leadership meeting I assisted to there were very few comrades because they were in the countryside, for whatever reason, but I was not told: such days are the days when we meet and this time everyone is here but for exceptions. I did not get that impression. I had a meeting with the comrades who have returned from abroad where it was already noticed they come from another experience. The speech by Comrade K, who is a middle cadre – almost less than middle —, was extraordinary; he is a comrade who has been formed in the ranks. Also comrade N, a rank-and-file comrade but who comes from another structure. F was there, and there were two extraordinary speeches, by Comrade N and by Comrade K. Comrade K took out a piece of paper and said: comrades, there are 31 professionals, there are only US\$ 300 of contribution, 30 people paid duties in Lima and those 30 contributors give a derisory sum. It is not clear what the dues are all over the country. Reports like this, statistics. We are Marxists. We move by statistics. You could tell he was coming from another party; he was typical of the current. When K spoke, I got the impression of coming out of a dream.

I will tell you the joke I told the Uruguayan comrades, who always thought it was in very bad taste. When I saw the statistics for Uruguay, I learned with surprise that for 10 years the gross domestic product had not stopped coming down, which is the ultimate

reason for the emergence of Tupamaros. Considering what had been that great middle class and the incredible and growing misery in which the country entered together with Haiti, I told them: if this continues, the activity of the party will be for one comrade to lend his arm to another comrade to make a stew one day and the next day an arm to another for the same because here there is a situation of total crisis of the country - which later was fulfilled because half a million Uruguayans left the country to eat.

With 31 professionals and 30 contributors in Lima, you soon will have to see each other when E comes to say: you lend me the left arm or the right or something; because I do not know how I will eat. And in our current, this is a religious issue. A party is a catastrophe if professionals do not collect wages religiously. The professionals have to be paid on due date. Sometimes it's justified. In Colombia two years ago, professionals were paid in a timely manner. I will not raise ideal situations. But three or four months ago a new team took over leadership, which is not very efficient for now, as long as they gain experience; then they did not collect the contributions and did not pay the professionals in due date. This situation may happen but with exceptional character.

We have learned professionals are not paid here. And how are they going to be paid? We begin to see a phantasmagorical panorama. Thirty-one professionals, from where do you plan to pay them? Thirty one professionals, which means about US\$4000 in wages. US\$4000 means, I do not know, about one million soles per month in contributions. According to the rules of the current, they are paid with the contributions. Are you going to have 1,000,000 soles of contributions to pay within a month or a fortnight? They are norms of the current. That's why we are who we are. Everything organised, statistical. The calculation of the current is for every 30 militants, a professional. Do you mean you will have 1,000 firm contributing members, who will contribute from four to five dollars per month each, to cover the US\$4000 of contribution? Yes or no? Such is a Bolshevik party, serious. Where are the finances? Where is the cash? Where do you keep the money? Where is the cash flow? We are going to pay like this, in such a way and such another. Where are the accounting books? What are the plans?

A Bolshevik party is scientific, rational; everything is done based on plans. You may make a mistake and then you make other plans to amend the mistakes. But, where are the plans? Here we live a total empiricism. How come 31 professionals? Where are we going to get the money? Will the current keep paying? Then will you depend on us? It is not a party that runs on its own legs, i.e., it owes US\$40,000. How, what plan do you have to pay the US\$40,000, besides the professionals? Do we have plans? Nothing. Silence. Charade. We signalled to F and he does so (there is a gesture by F), which in the game of charade we do not know what it means, but it must mean "do not hit me".

Number of militants

The other problem is the number of militants. My impression is you have some 70 militants. There F and the other comrades are counting the numbers showing you have between 100 and 150. The amount of contributors is not well known; the amount of newspapers sold is not well known. Nothing is well known. And I insist again, we are Marxists. Statistics are not used only to show the bourgeoisie is earning increasingly more in Peru and the proletariat is earning increasingly less. This statistic, this very same method we use for the bourgeoisie, we must use it for within. Otherwise, ours is a petty-bourgeois current, of ideological type. We are scientific to judge the adversary class; we are not scientific to judge the other class and our party. We have to be scientists, statisticians, trying like Comrade K did: there are 31 professionals; it means that for every two or three militants there is a professional. Is this normal? We have to be honest, that's why we asked for this meeting. We want to know what we are. Nothing scares us. The whole future is ours. We are very optimistic. But we demand this method, not yours. The concrete situation, what is it? Let's see? I want you to know that to be leaders you have to know the reality of the party. What is the financial, organisational situation? I know you do not have it. The few

data you have are impressions. How many militants are there? What do they contribute? Premises? Well, what data do you have? (Someone answers.)

Well, suppose that in Lima we have the same as in the interior, 200 contributors in all of Peru. You have 100 or 120 militants, and what average do they contribute? A dollar and a half? It is US\$ 300 per month and you, between deficit of newspaper and deficit of professionals, have a deficit above US\$ 8000. Your income is US\$ 300 dollars and you spend US\$ 8000. Let's say it's half. You spend US\$ 4000 or US\$ 5000 dollars of deficit and your income is US\$ 400. Is it normal? Not at all. And the problem is aggravated by the electoral campaign, which, however modest it may be, will leave us with a deficit of US\$ 12,000. That is the financial situation.

4. The internal regime: Bonapartism versus Bolshevism

But this would not be the most serious thing. This is the normal, financial, statistical aspect, very important. But static, let's call it that. Not dynamic. What worries us most is a problem that worried us a lot in the Argentine party: the party regime. What we have called a Bonapartist regime. We have discovered, discussing with the PST (A), that due to the repression and lack of legality, in the PST (A), all the habits of the internal regime have been lost.

Nothing outside the organisms

According to the tradition of the party, nothing is done outside of party organisms. Not even talks. No resolution is adopted outside the organisms. Always in the organisms, respecting everything, the EC, a secretariat is a secretariat. Nothing is done, even if it goes much slower, because it goes safely, solidly if it is through organisms. This is how everyone learns. We discovered the problems by an accident like the telephone call.

We in the current voted that only 65 comrades could come to the Congress for security reasons and 110 showed up. We were scared. How? That 70 had come, well, we are not Puritans. The current had said 50. We had discussed a lot with the Argentine leadership; we reached a written resolution, which it had to be not more than 65. We prepared the entire congress of the PST (A) based on 65 and suddenly we get a hundred plus just like that. We said: who did this? Why did a hundred plus come? We learned: the secretary general, on the trip, came up with the idea it was better than 65, which was not what he discussed with us in the resolution. Then there was a stormy meeting with the Argentina leadership, shouting, we were about to suspend the Congress. And what is that? It is a resolution voted by an organism. It is sacred. We voted, the secretary of the current and the Argentine secretariat: only 65. They cannot bring 66. How do they bring us 45 more?

Then from there, we learned these kinds of things were common. The general secretary is the one who leads the party, adopts resolutions in the corridors while walking to one side, and we were totally scared. Then we raised in the leadership and in the Argentine Congress: comrades, the regime in the Argentine party has changed. Before, it was a Bolshevik regime; everything was done by democratic centralism and slowly. Trotsky says the Bolshevik party was slow, the reverse of the Menshevik. It was slow because everything was done through organisms. But it was safe, the whole party was committed. There was a thorough discussion, plans were made, ideas were exchanged; a member of the leadership had doubts, it was delayed until next week unless it is a strike or a transcendent fact of the class struggle, which does not allow us to wait. For example, here, it was time to choose the formula. E has doubts, bad luck. But the leaders are always hierarchised; those who are

leaders are leaders. They are consulted about everything. If there are doubts, we wait and the same must happen in the ranks.

The Bonapartist regime has a tendency to make ideology, also in Argentina. They came and told us: there is a rise this year, there is a revolution, the bourgeoisie is all undone, there are no agreements, and economically it earns nothing. Everything was catastrophic for the bourgeoisie and fantastic for us. The discussions are there (we have printed the discussions with the comrades). This Bonapartist regime has to create a permanent euphoria. Not that there is no discussion; it is discussed outside of organisms, individually. What do you think, do we do this? Yes, no, this or that. But it is Bonapartist because it is not done through organisms and only through organisms. And there is a tendency to create an ideology.

What is a Bolshevik regime? It was largely through the discussion of the PST (A) that we discovered many comrades, the new generation, do not know what the Bolshevik regime is. The Bolshevik regime begins by being democratic centralist, but democratic centralism does not mean everything is discussed with everyone. Democratic centralism means it is discussed in organisms, it is resolved in organisms, and organisms are hierarchised and functioning permanently. Else, there is no Bolshevik organisation. This always makes the Bolshevik resolutions slow, because they are democratic because they have to be discussed in the organisms. Logically, organisms cannot always be meeting; they meet once a week — the bureau, on a fixed day; cells, on a fixed day — and if there are doubts, they go to the next week, or if there is a lot of trouble they meet the next day, but not imposing bureaucratically. Nor does it have to be a formal democracy. We meet and we vote. No, if a leader or a grassroots militant has doubts, another meeting is held, he is told to think, to discuss, if he thinks he may be right; and the resolution is adopted by the organism. We delay to convince everyone before taking action. The difference is that once the Bolsheviks begin the action they are not the mess the Mensheviks are.

Written Analysis and perspectives

It has to be done based on written analysis and perspectives, very clear, with subsequent balance sheets. They will be wrong many times if they are a young leadership but writing is very good. For example, we had — all of us who came from the centre — discussions with F. Had you reported you had 400 or 500? F said no, he reported 200, this and that. We, the current, are organised. We had all read it. So F had to surrender to the evidence. Everyone told him: before coming here, we were given the Peru folder, we read the newspaper, we read the correspondence and it said this. All of us who returned have this impression. Thus, we have to put things in writing: a week later we state this, that we would do this and this, we were wrong in this... in this we were right. It does not guarantee we won't be wrong. Not at all. But in this way, we can learn from our mistakes. Nothing else. It has to be written analysis, clear perspectives, with subsequent balance sheets of what was achieved and what was not achieved. This, what we are doing in financial, newspaper, the debt of the current, makes to the method.

Written perspectives and mandatory balance sheets. Else, it is not a Bolshevik party, everything stays in the oral issue: I said it was this and that, and the great discussions made are not to draw conclusions, to agree or not according to the perspectives that had been defined. For example, comrades of the Argentine leadership think they will get over 8 percent of the votes, I think it'll be less, I estimated between 4 and 5 percent with great enthusiasm. I'm recording this, but I have no problem in writing this analysis. Almost certainly, I will make a mistake, I know little, but later we see why I made a mistake, we do the analysis, we adjust the screws. Can those who believe we'll get more than 8 percent be wrong? We will see why. But all this allows the subsequent analysis; and based on the mistakes we draw the lessons, the conclusions that allow us to learn.

Thus, democratic centralism has to be through the organisms: secretariat, bureau, central committee, cells, and regions. It has to be very democratic, a democracy of content. It has to be with written analysis and perspectives and with balance sheets written after these analyses and perspectives. Did we achieve the goals we pointed out in that perspective? No, we achieved half. Why? There is no other way to learn.

But as we said, this problem is not only yours. I say this because I point a lot to F. He does not have individual importance. It also has to do with the comrades who have passed through here, because the phenomenon is of the entire Southern Cone, due to the influence of the Argentine party. They have great responsibility P, E and all the comrades who have passed through here. Because, I insist again, this problem of the Bonapartist and non-Bolshevik regime was raised in relation to the Argentine party. What is your problem then, comrades?

Political successes and party structure

First, let it be known well what we discuss. That you progressed? Enormously. That you are a thousand times better than three or two years ago? Enormously. That you were a small group of 10, 15, or 20 militants and today you have influence over hundreds? No doubt. I say this to not begin to discuss when there is nothing to be discussed; to not open a door which is already open. Do not come to me with things like we are a thousand times better; we were 20, now we grew; we did not have influence by hundreds, now we do; we expanded to a national scale, whether we expanded. We are discussing a crisis, effects, mistakes which for me are very serious. Very serious because they have to do with the regime, this is the main and fundamental point of our current. We are discussing principles and not whether you progress.

I think Hugo Blanco also made a lot of progress if we start from the six or seven he took when he broke with our group, and we see how Hugo Blanco today, there is no doubt, has progressed as much or more than we have, within his conception of the party. That this conception is not ours? It is his conception. He left with six or seven, and I think today he has 60 or 70 maniacs at least, or 600 or 700 maniacs, who follow him, who admire him, students, etc., etc. I would cut my hands if it is not like this. Even more: he has also spread nationally, those six or seven have six or seven in each place. We know all this development is not done with the same criterion of our structure. We understand well, they will not be our party; they are not of the current. Hugo Blanco does not care; he is not interested in having a party or this party structure. He is interested in having sympathisers, people who raise him on a litter. And this for sure has him more organised than before.

Everyone has progressed in this rise. Also the POMR. I disagree with this picture that it is a ship adrift. Everyone progressed. This is a cart full of fruit that goes to the fair and touches everyone. So let's not fool ourselves that we progress because here the blind progresses. The problem is whether we progress in a good way, or whether we progress in a wrong way and go towards a precipice despite the growth, the influence. For example, without the help of the current, you would be absolutely nothing but it is a help that is leading you astray. It is not helping you to consolidate as a Bolshevik party but to create a current with full Bonapartist and Menshevik characteristics. Then do not come and tell me we are making progress, we are a national party. Because I tell you, it's the least you could have done.

I think you have had great political analyses, but not developed to the end, not exploited to the end; you have not taken advantage of the very good political analyses. You have been right a lot. You have lacked consequence; you lack leadership, a strong leadership. And what is very serious is you begin to make an ideology: that this entire phenomenon is for us, and that everything is very bad for the others. Here comes the problem of Comrade F. In the current situation the comrade is not responsible for anything. He is one of those who have helped the most, has had great tactical successes, but the

comrade is not a leader of the current. He was not in Venezuela nor is he here, mainly due to the influence of Argentina, especially of Comrades E and P who have stressed the need for political successes without combining it with the organisational aspect of the Bolshevik party structure. Political success is not the same as the Bolshevik structuring of the party.

Example: the theses of the permanent revolution were from Trotsky, but he did not build the Bolshevik party. The thesis of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry — wrong — was Lenin's, and yet he built the Bolshevik party. There is no mechanical relationship: correct political position equals Bolshevik party.

In Argentina, there was a man named Leal, who was a quasi-genius. He wrote extraordinary political analyses; very superior to mine. However, he never made a party. He made better analyses, whether of Peronism, of the resistance, of the crisis, of everything; his writings are extraordinary. The only one who remembers him is me, who was his great enemy because I was an admirer of him even though he was human scum. He was lumpen, he was incapable of structuring a party, and he was incapable of having professionals, of having proletarian morality, of nothing. He passed without pain or glory. I remember him with old friends: How great Leal was, how well he wrote, what brilliant analyses. He followed our steps too, he even entered Peronism, everything, he was much brighter than me. And he did not build a party because he did not know what it was like to build a party. He did not know what this regime is, he did not know what it is to do a balance sheet, to have professionals, every 30 militants a professional, not more; or it can be every 15 but if we have 30 in a month or two.

E and P have stressed this defect that the political success is everything. No. It's building a party. And building a party has techniques, morality, mechanics, and analysis, which are not mechanically equal to political success. Without political success, the entire party is destroyed. But if we do not know how to build the party, there is also no political success and it cannot be exploited. And you are the greatest example. You have had extraordinary political successes, such as the FOCEP [Worker Peasant Student and Popular Front]. The success of the FOCEP with a party like the Argentine, God forbid! No problem of Hugo Blanco, no problems of any kind.

A respected national leadership

I think F in the circumstances does a great evil to the party. He is a leader; he is the one who presented the meeting. It's horrifying. We look at each other with the comrades who have returned and we want to fall backwards. The entire current has been in Colombia. I did not go to the CC meetings. To a few meetings of the bureau. Or do I exaggerate, comrades? I lived in Colombia. I did not attend. Reports were given by Comrade C or E. What is this about F giving the National report? Here? To the CC? Are you not ashamed? What is that? Never again. Nobody has to give a report to the Peruvian party. The Peruvian leaders have to give them. That goes against everything! It is not a criterion of the current! I feel ashamed that F is of the current and he has the impudence of giving a report here. What does it mean? Peru needs a Peruvian leadership and the current gives money so that there is a Peruvian leadership. Where are we? In Colombia, despite having lived so long after I left Peru, I have never given a single national report. I have not been to many CC meetings. I do not attend CC meetings. Only a very few political bureau meetings. My influence is of different kind. To exchange ideas, what I said: analysis, see how we discuss. We have helped from the ranks. Comrade R. after two or three years went to the leadership and she has presented some organisational reports, and not the main ones. The main reports are always in the hands of Colombian comrades. Where are we? This mistake is fatal. And Bonapartism revolves around Comrade F and tactical political successes.

We are not making a Peruvian leadership team. This is why radical solutions are needed, comrades. We have very serious problems here. Very serious, because we have the election hanging over us, and we have 10 comrades here professionalized. We have

a mess; you have made a monumental mess. You are a bunch of irresponsible people, starting with Comrade F but you got into a deficit of US\$ 10,000, where will you pay it from? There will be hunger here. Now you depend on the current more than ever, instead of depending increasingly less. Are you crazy? This looks like an asylum, not a party. Then radical solutions are needed. First, we must begin to establish a solid leadership, a political bureau, and vindicate the comrades. Here, you have to work together but to death and know all the current looks at you as the leadership. T, P, E, C, R, they will report from now on and we will vindicate them. Let's see whether Comrade A too, tradition is fundamental. They have to know this is the leadership team, plus other comrades. You will say who, and this is the great team, which will lead the electoral campaign and we will help, no more.

Unfortunately, we will have to help a lot because you put us here in a bag of cats. Otherwise, only one or two would be left, and we would send people as you grew, to be a help. You will lead. We will make a solid leadership team, you will meet once a week, and you will make a solid secretariat. If possible T will come here and F has to go in a flash. He has to return with P and E, go to a factory; he has to acquire other habits, because in Venezuela he made a similar mess, although he is not the culprit. We have to discuss whether we do it right now, so the party knows it has changed, that it has a Peruvian leadership, and then Comrade M and Comrade C have to come to give advice. When I come here, without seeing me, you discuss general or very specific questions of aid, well-made plans: where the money is, we invest it in such a place; discussions like that. Little by little, the perspective is they leave or if they stay they become integrated. Who will be the newspaper's editors?

And if there's no chance of making that team, we leave. We don't make a party from the outside. We leave. If T, T, P, E, and C take the leadership, they will be respected as great national leaders. We will not let anyone undermine them; they will be sacred. This is the method of structuring Bolshevik parties on a national scale. Other leadership comrades will join them. With them we will discuss, we will try to get them to achieve a great prestige; all reports are presented by them. If the first ones are weak, the next ones will be better. Discuss whether T comes already. Discuss afterwards the concrete problems, what we do to get out of the swamp, of all this mess. Let's see if we can get it right, it is possible we can.

Every militant has to be socially structured

The social problem. We need to ensure that every comrade, other than a student, who does not have a normal lifestyle, we get it for him. We have been finding out about taxis or something, so all the comrades work. Everyone has to have a social location. It has to be the party that looks for work. Everyone has to earn well; if possible US\$ 200 or US\$ 300. Everything normal, normal people. Normal Peruvians who do Trotskyism in Peru — normal — with normal people, with normal marriages. If they have problems, normal problems in the marriage. Everything is normal. Like E, that the messes are also normal.

Let's organise the party from its leadership

This is the party we want and which we will have to make as of this meeting. Is it clear? This meeting is very important. First, if the symptomatology we give is correct, then we must use the scalpel; perform surgery to develop the enormous possibilities the party has. You have huge possibilities. Now we have to go down, until we hit bottom. What is solid, and from there we start step by step to rise.

We must use the elections to emerge strengthened and have a solid structure. There are many other issues we can discuss; we have suggested the great task for this month is that of the legal representatives. We have already discussed with E many other issues. We have to discuss the electoral issue. But the first thing is to discuss these questions: How do we organise the party from the leadership? How do teams meet, whether it is by region? Which premises, how we pay for them, what bonds, etc., etc.? And what national leadership respected by the whole party takes the helm of this party for a year or two, with political

leaders, where a division of tasks is imposed most appropriate for the difficult moment we are going through?

I'm sorry if I've been a bit pessimistic, however, it's just the appearance. I am very optimistic. I think we can build a big Bolshevik party, we can have a great leadership, but we have to begin by being honest and using the Bolshevik method: statistical, serious, and concrete to analyse our own party, and from there, begin to rise, to overcome all this tremendous crisis in which I think we are submerged: crisis of growth, crisis of progress. Of course, do not come to me with I said there is no progress, great growth. But this progress and growth have posed an acute crisis that must be resolved quickly because, otherwise, it will attempt against the party.

I do not have anything else to add, comrades.

Addendum

Contribution from a letter to E

Bogota, 11 April 1980

I have begun to surmise the idea, which scares me and does not let me sleep, that the problem is not personal, but the conception of the party's regime, how it is built. What really scares me is not Peru but our party and you. I have the impression the very fruitful discussion we have had about the regime is even deeper, much deeper. I suspect both you and F, unconsciously, are sitting on a powder keg which is a conception of the party that is completely misconceived. That a Bolshevik party is based on tactical political successes, that with only those essentially tactical achievements we build the Bolshevik party. It terrifies me to think we have this theory and this practice. If this were the case, we would have a "Trotskyist" deviation from early Trotsky and not from Trotsky after 1917.

There is no identity between the categories of "political and theoretical successes" and party construction. They are intimately linked but are different. It is not the same to build an industrial union as to give a good slogan for industrial workers. We can be bad builders of unions and give good union lines. The best example was Mateo Fossa, he was a genius giving line but unable to organise anything in a union. To avoid him being shipwrecked, Stalinism had to bring him from Uruguay an extraordinary union organiser.

I am terrified you are doing a school on this and that the entire Southern Cone lives only on politics, that this tragic and misguided conception is being inculcated. Trotsky was right in his theory and program of permanent revolution for Russia; Lenin was not but the Bolshevik party was built by Lenin and not by Trotsky. Hilferding was right about imperialism before Lenin but the best instrument to fight against imperialism, the Third International, was built by Lenin and Trotsky. The successes are very important, decisive to build and develop a Bolshevik party. But not enough, only necessary.

The party, like a house, is built according to certain rules and without the strict application of those rules the only thing that can be done are projects of houses or parties but never solid parties. These proletarian rules are those that, as we have insisted in the Congress, must be applied daily: everything through the organisms, with written analyses and perspectives, corroboration of those analyses and perspectives in writing through balance sheets, discipline, criticism and self-criticism. And all this controlled through scientific methods, statistics, concrete results, votes, contributions, meetings, sales of publications, demonstrations, participation in the struggles, in mass organisations, regularity throughout the internal workings of the party, clear delimitation of militants and sympathisers, preventing like the plague our parties be transformed into movements

or centrist parties in the organisational grounds (this evil is much more serious than sometimes falling into centrist mistakes by the pressure of the mass movement), sound finances, precise and strict plans in all areas, mainly in finance; once again healthy finances, punctual payment to professionals, and so on and so forth.

These are some of the characteristics of a truly Bolshevik and, therefore, proletarian organisation. They are the methods of the working class: discipline and organisation, organisation and discipline. Without these two elements we cannot succeed and develop as we want.

You pointed out with insight that the Faction was the best organised but it had many organisational flaws. That's so and you are absolutely right. Neither Me nor A are great organisers and this task falls essentially on them, since I am mainly dedicated to the theoretical-political problems. But what distinguishes the current is it preaches and does everything possible to fit this model. We try to convince all parties to have good finances and to conform as much as possible to this model. What worries me — perhaps I am exaggerating and seeing differences where there are none — is that you, where you go through or have influence, are preaching something different.

Honestly, I'm worried, very worried this is the case. As much as this, I am worried about a negative fact; that in all the time you were here you have not published an exhaustive document on the catastrophe of the congress preparation. And within this analysis, the personal responsibilities. Was it due to lack of time or because unconsciously you are gaining time not to use the scalpel thoroughly? I see in the preparation of the congress, logically save for the differences, elements very similar to those I found in Peru. We see mistakes as much or more delirious in the preparation of our national congress as in Peru. Camilo pointed this to me the other day. As in Peru, there are spectacular achievements. For example, in Peru we have become a national movement, we go out, we get everywhere, we win for the movement the 400 or 500 comrades they have reported, each one does what he wants and gets where he wants, but at the cost of demolishing the party structure. Just like there, everyone congratulates F for his political successes, for having overcome the previous leadership that lived for within, in a sectarian and organisational life.

I am afraid the leadership of M and yours are antagonistic poles. That our party is at this moment, in its own way, in a mess as big as the Peruvian, more a movement than a party. That our party under Ma. has been a party that lived for the organisation and not within the mass movement. If that's the case, it's about achieving a synthesis. This is human synthesis too. In the Martín stage the organisers predominated, in yours the tacticians, the unionists and the pushers predominate. A coincidence? Quite possibly this single fact would confirm my suspicions. It is about achieving a methodological and personal synthesis.

Nahuel Moreno