



Nahuel Moreno

**On Bengochea's
split with Palabra
Obrera**

**(Letter to Angel Bengochea,
Report to the Plenum of
Palabra Obrera)**

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Letter to Angel Bengochea (24 January 1964)

Report to the Plenum of Palabra Obrera (28 June 1964)

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Foreword to the 2021 edition

In 1947, the GOM made its first foray into the student movement. In La Plata, they won a sector of the leadership of the youth of the Socialist Party and several militants. Among them were “Vasco” Angel Bengochea (1925-1964), Milciades Peña and Horacio Lagar.

Bengochea became proletarian at the Anglo Meatworks, and later he worked at the chemical factory Duperial. He consolidated himself as a national leader and great propagandist throughout the 1950s. And he established a close personal friendship with Nahuel Moreno. In these letters, the treatment of “you” (instead of the usual Spanish “thou”) responds to customs of the time since it was common for close friends to be formal.

After the fall of the bourgeois nationalist government of Peron in 1955, the POR promoted since 1957 the Movement of Workers’ Groups, together with Peronist leaders, and began to publish the newspaper *Palabra Obrera*, with Bengochea as its director. Between 1957 and 1958 the newspaper was seized from newsstands 14 times by the repression of the military dictatorship. Bengochea was prosecuted on each of those occasions and was imprisoned for about a year.

In the early 1960s, the victory of the Cuban revolution and the emergence of socialist Cuba with its expropriations transformed Castroism into a powerful movement with great influence throughout Latin America and Focal and Guevarist guerrilla groups began to proliferate. In this context, in 1961 in the Cusco valleys of La Convencion and Lares in Peru, a great peasant rise began, a powerful movement of land occupations and unionisation that demanded and began to impose agrarian reform. The occupations were defended in an armed manner by the peasants who had formed the unions. It was led by Hugo Blanco, a Trotskyist leader trained in Argentina in the party of Nahuel Moreno and leader of the Peruvian Revolutionary Left Front (FIR).

For *Palabra Obrera*, support for the struggle of Hugo Blanco became one of its central concerns. When the Punta del Este Conference was held, with the presence of Che Guevara, in August 1961, Moreno interviewed him to interest him in that struggle and to ask the Cuban leadership for support for Blanco.

In Lima, the FIR fell into a putschist deviation, arguing that by raising money to buy weapons the Peruvian revolution would triumph. With Argentine Daniel Pereyra (Alonso) at the helm, in December 1961 and April 1962, they carried out two bank robberies in Lima that culminated in the arrest of the participants and the near annihilation of the FIR. Hugo Blanco was left isolated and without the support of the party. Bengochea travelled to Lima after the first robbery and before the second; upon his return, he expressed his concern and pessimism about the situation of the FIR and the positions of its leaders.

After the robberies, Hugo Blanco’s situation became increasingly complicated. He did not have any urban support since the FIR was dismantled and, as the distribution of land was consolidated, the mobilisation tended to weaken.

In June 1962, five comrades from *Palabra Obrera* travelled to Cuba, with the urgent goal of getting the support of the Cuban leadership, with weapons and trained men, for Hugo Blanco, who was being harassed by the Peruvian army forces. They were led by Angel Bengochea and it had been voted they stay a maximum of three months. The trip lasted until 1963. In February some of the comrades returned, with nothing concrete to support Blanco, who was imprisoned in May.

A crisis began to open since the trip voted for three months had been extended for much longer without news or explanations. It became evident that important differences had emerged with the comrades who had travelled around the issues of the guerrilla, the armed struggle, the party, etc. And even more worrying, it was already a fact that Blanco, who was suffering the tenacious persecution from the Peruvian army, would not have any support from the Cuban leadership.

In March of that year, the leadership resolved to make public its differences with the orientation towards Che's guerrilla focus held by the comrades. On the first page of *Palabra Obrera* No 247, dated 11 November 1963, it said in an article on politics for Argentina:

“Many genuinely revolutionary comrades believe the workers' revolution is an immediate historical perspective in our country and the current task is to launch it, and for this, they hold that the revolutionary armed struggle must be initiated in the form of guerrillas, sabotage, etc., independently of what the workers do or think. These comrades start from the mistake of confusing the technique of armed struggle with the art of insurrection, which is the culmination of the class struggle. They do not analyse the current situation of the working class and the people. They do not pause to think that the class is on the defensive, cornered, fighting heroic battles (Kaiser, Chrysler, Santa Ana) but lacking an organisation and a revolutionary leadership that plans the defensive struggles as a whole, to transform them into offensive ones. These comrades, with their insurrectionary proposals outside the workers, are gradually moving away from them and, as in the case of Venezuela, they can be repudiated by a large part of the workers and the peasantry who support the sepoys, Betancourt. Without solving the contradiction between the historical needs and the current situation of the workers, the instruments and the movement suitable for the victory of the people will never be built.”

On page 3 of the same issue, there was an article saying the Peruvian revolution was underway, with Hugo Blanco as the leader of the peasant masses. The caption of his picture said: “Hugo Blanco; no insurrection is fostered and carried out in isolation from the masses”. And another article on Venezuela briefly enumerated the violent actions of terrorism, sabotage, seizure of ministries and radio stations, attacks against President Betancourt and other very bloody events that the guerrilla groups had been developing and were responded to by the army with fierce repression. And it made a clear and forceful criticism of this action:

“Although the FLN has a revolutionary goal: the overthrow of Betancourt, its methods, which continually are military strikes and actions, lead to turning its actions into adventures of great heroism, it is true, but they do not lead to its goal for a fundamental reason: they do not rely on the masses. On the contrary, isolated terrorism leads them to achieve the opposite, that is, to separate themselves from the workers and poor peasants, whose mobilisation is the only guarantee of a revolutionary victory.

“It is important to point out the differences that exist between the methods of the FLN and the revolutionary action developed by the peasant unions of Peru under the leadership of Hugo Blanco.

“The two revolutionary movements call for action but while the FLN leadership relies on violence and terrorism as the only method, without relying on the masses and gets, as a result, the fierce repression of the Betancourt government, which imprisons and kills the best of the revolutionary vanguard, Hugo Blanco, relying on the armed peasant unions, a new tool of struggle that the masses have forged, is carrying out an authentic agrarian reform in vast regions of Peru.”

In June 1963, Vasco (“Basque”) returned to Buenos Aires and a debate began to develop in the leadership. In August, at a leadership meeting, it was approved to allow Vasco to develop an experience separate from the party but related to it through the Secretariat, subject to various

conditions. The fundamental one referred to political discipline with the party and absolute loyalty to it, that is, the duty of Bengochea's team to report on the activities it was going to develop and their results. It also established a commitment of "contributions" based on the political needs of the party.

By that time, the resounding failures of several attempts by guerrilla groups in different countries (Paraguay, Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, among others) had already been taking place.

At the beginning of 1964, it was becoming evident the distancing from *Palabra Obrera* of Bengochea and the group of comrades who opted to turn to the preparation of a guerrilla group in Tucuman, as part of a plan promoted by Guevara himself in different countries.

The letter from Moreno to Vasco of 24 January 1964 that we reproduce could not be delivered to him since he was not in Buenos Aires. At the end of March, Vasco and Moreno finally met; Moreno handed him the letter and they agreed to hold a plenum of *Palabra Obrera*. In the plenum, Bengochea made a report, and then Moreno's written report was read. This report was delivered in print to each participant and we reproduce it after the January letter. In that plenum, a break with ultra-fraternal relations was defined, albeit with ambiguities.

In July, Bengochea and other comrades were killed in an explosion in the apartment they occupied in a building on Posadas Street in Buenos Aires.

To broaden the subject, the reader can consult *Workers' and Internationalist Trotskyism in Argentina*, by Ernesto Gonzalez (coordinator), Volume 3, Book 1.

The debate that Moreno poses to Bengochea in these papers about Guevarism, the Cuban revolution, the guerrillas and the building of the party was developed and published in September 1964 in the magazine *Estrategia*, with the article *Two methods for the Latin American Revolution* (republished in September 2017 by CEHuS in Buenos Aires and available at www.nahuelmoreno.org).

All notes are by the editor

Mercedes Petit¹

1 **Mercedes Petit** is a Trotskyist militant, a journalist, and a researcher. In the 1960s, she joined the current headed by Nahuel Moreno (www.nahuelmoreno.org), with whom she collaborated in theoretical elaboration and propaganda tasks. After the 1976 military coup, they shared exile in Colombia. Petit wrote *Elementary Political Concepts* and *Our Experience with Lambertism* in 1986 together with Nahuel Moreno (both available in www.nahuelmoreno.org); *Notes for a History of Trotskyism* (2005) and *Working Women and Marxism* (2009, with Carmen Carrasco). She writes in *El Socialista* (www.izquierdasocialista.org.ar) and *International Correspondence* (www.uit-ci.org).

Letter to Angel Bengochea

Buenos Aires, 24 January 1964

My dear Vasco,

After thinking long and hard about our meeting, it occurred to me that we run the risk that several very important issues and problems will slip away from us in the chat. That is why I decided to prepare this letter to organise the agenda of our talk well and for it to bear fruit in clear and precise resolutions.

Many times, we have had chats of transcendental importance but it occurs to me this is the most important of all we have had to date. By train of assumptions, I also suspect it is the most critical for our relations and for yours with the party you helped found and develop, that is, our party. I have the presumption that together with the group of comrades who have you as their undisputed leader, you are experiencing a critical situation regarding all of us and our organisation. I hope I am wrong! I believe the breakup and crisis between us, old friends, comrades, is haunting. If something has prevented it and prevents it so far, it is precisely a whole life that we have in common. To use terms dear to you and me, I would say that the “in-itself” unites us and the “for-itself” separates us. This letter has this goal: to specify the differences well and bring to the red-hot, without false fears, the future that perhaps separates us.

It also has another goal, one that for me is fundamental: to show you that you have been and are my greatest friend, the comrade who, along with Horacio [Lagar] and Ernesto [Gonzalez], perhaps also Daniel [Pereira], I respect and love the most. Frankly speaking, without a doubt, the best friend I have ever had in my personal political life. I want political clarity to lead us to the political breakup, if necessary, without breaking at all those personal ties that have tied me and still tie me to you. For almost 20 years, I have been linked to you by fraternal ties, which have led me to share with you the most intimate subjective and personal comments, which in principle I have not exchanged with anyone. I don't see any reason to break them. However, political confusion can lead to distancing that I consider unjustified.

When you returned from Cuba, you raised a question of trust with the leadership as a whole and with me personally. Both the leadership and I voted for it with joy and with both hands. Personally, I was the one who voted for it with the most joy and trust. After one of those usual stormy, head-to-head meetings that we have had for years and years, I promised you my fullest trust and support as a friend and comrade. I honestly believe we have shown you in the facts that this was the case. Against all odds, enduring all kinds of reports and suspicions, I made it an issue of total trust in you. When I personally resolved to keep this trust, through thick and thin, I was already continuing a line that we had voted on at the Secretariat months before you came, in the document that you know. Then we resolved that two perspectives were opening: that you would break or abide by the discipline (a third was constantly considered: that you abide to better break later, which I will analyse later). If

you abode, our trust in you would be confirmed. If you decided to break up, fall on your back (I think I informed you of this outcome) we resolved to give you all the possibilities and the data so you could fully apply your experience because I was not willing under any circumstances to argue or to fight personally or politically with you and since I considered you a great revolutionary, we should give you the opportunity to apply your revolutionary ideas. The Secretariat fully agreed with me: You meant too much for all of us to engage in a factional or controversial struggle with the comrade we loved the most. We all agreed to give you the means you may request. The middle one was for us a variation of this second possibility: even if you consciously or unconsciously used us to apply your experience, we had to let you do so, as long as there was no danger to the future of our organisation.

All of us have been aware that there were theoretical differences between you and the leadership that sooner or later had to manifest themselves in practice. However, we have all made efforts to achieve a *modus vivendi* that would allow us to continue to militate in common.

In these six months, our political-personal relations have been contradictory. I'm not talking about you but the team and the party. Those political-personal contradictions, which I will enumerate later, were resolved or concealed based on the total trust we had placed in you. When the moment arrived that seemed about to explode, I managed, with your presence in the Secretariat, that the Secretariat again place all its trust in you.

The Secretariat ratified this total trust in you because it saw you act, as I saw how you were acting, with all honesty and discipline towards the party. I want to insist on this aspect of the problem: no one in the party, or rather, in the senior leadership and even less personally, has anything to recriminate you for. On the contrary, you have been a model of honesty and personal and political loyalty. Regarding this, I want to point out two attitudes, before you, with your powerful memory, remind me of them.

When the financial problems were discussed, you were for the apparatus to contribute much more to the party and its campaigns, attacking my position as being petty and artisanal. At your suggestion, the figures I presented were accepted as provisional until partisan campaigns financed by the apparatus² you commanded were started. Moreover, you proposed that, if the Secretariat considered it appropriate, everything the apparatus had was to be contributed. You did the same with all other proposals: you systematically pointed out that you agreed to go to Peru or wherever, as long as you were sent with the team to fight. The Secretariat stood firmly, just like you, in the voted documents, and we were against you being an exporter of revolutions. We had to prepare for the Argentine revolution and help the others. But you always pointed out your faithful compliance with party resolutions. Personally, as long as I live, I will never forget the meeting that took place at home and the invitation to take a trip together. It was a personal invitation from one close friend to another — may it be repeated — that I will never forget. I raise all these facts so you do not believe that we had criticism or distrust in your attitudes but, on the contrary, a total, almost absolute, a trust which you, every day, ratified with your deeds.

These ever-deepening contradictions arose between the apparatus [headed by Bengochea] and the party of flesh and blood, that is, among the militants of flesh and blood. They were getting further and further apart. At first because of common faults, of both ranks; lately, I have the impression it is especially because of the militants of the apparatus. This is how coincidentally, for months, all the reports without exception point out that all the members of the team in their conversations, systematically attack your political organisation, which is ours and is the same as long as it is not proven otherwise, for a reformist policy or for not doing a thorough surface work. We have never heard comrades in the team stating that we cannot be reformists given that our greatest financial efforts, in recent months, were dedicated to strengthening and maintaining the team, that *Palabra Obrera* was not printed and widely circulated for the same reason. In short, that the team has been

2 **Technical apparatus or team** refers to the preparation and training of a group of comrades, totally firm and disciplined to the party, who can act in the protection of mobilisations, worker conflicts or factory sit-ins, and who since 1961 had been trained to go and support the armed struggle of Hugo Blanco in Cusco. In the proposals of this letter of January 1964, Moreno tells Bengochea to do a separate experience in Tucuman, and directly linked to the Secretariat, as had already been proposed in August 1963.

built by the political, organisational, personal and financial effort of our political organisation. No one has ever said those truths out loud: that we cannot be reformists because precisely the existence of the team created and developed by us alone proves the opposite. Nobody has ever said that we couldn't do big surface work or publish a printed *Palabra Obrera* since we have placed all of our financial efforts into consolidating the team. The work on our comrades by the comrades in the team seems an entryist work. We have always placed total trust in you and we have not attached any importance to these symptoms despite their unanimity. Nor have we given importance to the numerous reports we had about negotiations with other organisations, of which we had not been informed, nor to the internal reports of the most conspiratorial members of the apparatus, openly against our leadership on all grounds. Our trust in you was and is unlimited.

In the Secretariat and the Bureau, this coincidence in the reports before meeting with you again caused a discussion and a series of theories. I will list some of them for the discussion. At the Bureau, there have been comrades who believed these contradictions were because your and your team plan was perfectly designed: to gain time to structure a team that would allow you to start the guerrilla and then give the party a historic kick. At the Secretariat, the hypotheses that were considered were of complete trust in you and that the contradictions were because of various possibilities. 1) Unconscious practical reflection of deep theoretical differences; 2) Inevitable deviation from any party apparatus; 3) Centrifugal unconscious social and practical development of the party; and what I consider to be more coherent, 4) that you are of a foolproof loyalty to the party but you are completely convinced that the revolutionary axis is a guerrilla focus and you aspire to demonstrate to the party in the facts that it is so and, in that sense, you buy time to prove your truth to us.

Whatever the theoretical explanation for these contradictions between the flesh and blood apparatus and your foolproof honest behaviour, the current reality, openly, as it seems to me, is that the party does not currently have an apparatus unconditionally at its disposal, at the service of its political line, but a group, a magnificent guerrilla group. I don't even know if the party has a guerrilla group totally at its disposal. I would be very happy if you show me otherwise in our chat since, after all, this letter is a memory aid to clarify your concepts and doubts.

According to the conception we have of the next stages of the Argentine revolution, our party must have an apparatus unconditionally linked to its discipline and political program. This program is based on a series of fundamental premises, which I will not fail to remind you of just because they are known. They are:

- a) The guerrilla, in its narrow sense, peasant and in suitable geographical areas, does not solve or defeat by itself, nor as a fundamental factor, the imperialist and oligarchic regime we endure.
- b) This is because of a fundamental reason, only 20 per cent of the population is peasant and only 5 per cent of the peasant population is miserable, poor, totally alienated.
- c) This 5 per cent of the peasant population, totally alienated, poor, miserable, works in a production that is not basic in the capitalist structure of the country.
- d) The social-economic axis of the revolution is the urban sectors, mainly the working class and semi-working class or semi-unemployed.
- e) It is essential to exhaust the democratic stage, which is short-lived.
- f) The armed struggle and its apparatus must accompany and develop, even initiate, the struggle of the working class and in some regions of the extremely poor peasantry.
- g) Contradictions are accumulating that indicates the beginning of a major revival of the workers' movement.

Within these perspectives, our party has truly fabulous possibilities, as demonstrated by the Student Congress in Rosario. We can and must unify the entire revolutionary vanguard and transform ourselves in the short term into a powerful revolutionary party.

To achieve this objective and subjective process, the party must have an apparatus in its traditional places of work or intimately linked to those worksites. Needless to say, unconditionally

disciplined to the party. According to the party's analysis, a guerrilla group that can only do local and not national work is not enough. This need and this analysis demand from all of us, the party leaders, total clarity and absolute control of the apparatus of the guerrilla group. This requires us to begin to define clearly, with you, if we really have an apparatus or an embryo of apparatus intimately linked to our traditional workplaces, or if we essentially have a guerrilla group. Not only to specify the character of what we currently have but the degree of its discipline.

Whether it is a guerrilla group or a national apparatus that is not essentially guerrilla, there are two alternatives: a) that they be subject to our most rigorous discipline since from now on it will be rigorous, as distancing will cause the centrifugal tendencies to accelerate and we must fight that perspective with all vigour and determination; b) they break with the party and become an autonomous revolutionary group. At present, there are no other alternatives than these since our party cannot afford any kind of ambiguity. Let's see the two alternatives and their possible consequences:

A) They remain disciplined to the party

If this were the case, we must already be clear that this discipline is not a manoeuvre to stifle the narrow guerrilla experience since we consider it as highly positive but provided that it is limited and framed in the general analysis already carried out. Within this perspective, I believe the apparatus must be divided into two large zones: North, with guerrillas; Rest of the country, without guerrillas. Each of the zones will have a chief and a political commissar, appointed by the Secretariat. These chiefs and political commissars will belong to the zonal directorates and will be subject to zonal and party discipline. At the national level, there will be a chief and a political commissar under the same conditions, appointed by the Secretariat. I am letting you know in advance that I will vote with both hands for you and by mutual agreement, we will vote for the political commissar.

B) They break with the party

Three perspectives open. 1) We maintain diplomatic and cordial relations, for the exchange of information; 2) A front is formed with or without a majority of Palabra Obrera; 3) Fraternal relations specifying well the mutual obligations.

You, *Vasco*, see that I am trying to clarify the reality of the current apparatus and the future of its relations with us. I am not afraid of any alternatives or angry about them. On the contrary, I aspire for our political relations to be clear so that the personal ones remain so. Under no circumstances, not even under the worst variant for our party, the one of total breakdown, do I intend to make the least personal attack on you, nor stop considering you my close friend. Do not think this letter has any other purpose than clarity. I am your close friend because I know you are a great revolutionist. All political situations that arise, I consider attributable to the desire by both sides to make the revolution as quickly as possible. Is it worth getting angry about? I think a deep identity unites us as regards the philosophy of life. We both believe that praxis and action are the only creative things in man, in parties, in leaders, in classes.

We both want the revolution as quickly as possible. Seen this way, within a conception of history and life in common, our differences are circumstantial. That I try to specify them to the millimetre does not mean that I forget in general terms that everything unites us, nothing separates us. For this reason, although you and your team may decide to separate with all clarity and honesty from our organisation, to transform yourself into an autonomous revolutionary group, I am sure that I interpret not only my opinion but of all the comrades in the Secretariat and the leadership and I do tell you that we want to remain your most fraternal friends and also for our two organisations to follow a parallel path, brotherly, but to join in the revolution.

Today, more than ever, a fraternal hug from your friend forever.

Report to the Plenum of Palabra Obrera

Buenos Aires, 28 March 1964

Dear comrades,

Having been designated by the Secretariat to reply to Comrade Maen [Bengochea], I find myself faced with the painful alternative of not knowing precisely what I have to answer, given the lack of a document or draft resolution written by Comrade Maen. The only item I have is the agenda, which would force me to improvise without any seriousness an answer. Of course, I refuse to improvise an omnibus discussion about the human and the divine or what is the same on the agenda drawn up by Maen.

This situation goes against our tradition, which has always striven to achieve written and well-defined theoretical discussions through draft resolutions. In today's discussion, the opposite will happen. It is not a question of blaming anyone for this situation but we believe the Secretariat has made strenuous efforts for a year to try to achieve a serious theoretical-political discussion on all the problems that Comrade Maen's agenda touches. Despite our efforts, this could not be achieved since, except for the international and Latin American problem, in which Comrade Maen was in opposition to our theses, as he told us. This comrade permanently pointed out the secondary nature of his differences with us. This is why, given the enormous deficiencies in the preparation of this plenum, we already predict the confusing, contradictory nature that it will have, for which we have no responsibility. On the contrary, in a serious effort to try to organise the discussion and bring clarity to it, in an attitude of maximum respect to all the members of this plenum, I have allowed myself to prepare this written report, attaching a copy to each of the comrades. I would like it to be taken into account that this report has just been prepared on Friday in a rush and without major documentation. As I do not pretend to be the owner of the truth, I am satisfied if I manage to sort the debate somewhat and clarify the concepts to be discussed.

The plenum comrades must make an effort to help this report to provoke a fruitful and profitable discussion for all, avoiding falling into the false method of discussion of wanting to win the controversy by promoting small problems or anecdotes, that is, avoiding controversial skirmishes on small formal, minimal, anecdotal problems, to strive to discuss the fundamentals, the essentials of each one's program.

Within this method, we need to take into account that, with quotes and facts isolated from the whole of the activity, from the program of a tendency, a party or a militant, any position can be proven. An example of this, as I will demonstrate exhaustively as far as you see fit, is the total and absolutely false accusation that is made based on quotes taken from all my writings and forgetting they are quotations from documents to be published legally, such as *Peru: Two Strategies*,³ that I have

³ Available for downloading from www.nahuelmoreno.org. This work presents the polemic of Moreno against Daniel Pereyra about the putschist deviation in the FIR and the bank expropriations in Lima in December 1961 and April 1962.

been against the guerrillas in Peru. The historical truth is absolutely the opposite. I have been in Peru against the strategy of guerrilla warfare and armed struggle. As Maen, Pekines and Lamas, etc. know, the true letters not polished to be published legally say “armed struggle” or “guerrillas” instead of “open struggle”.

In an effort to apply this method of focusing all discussions on the essentials, I will begin by pointing out what I believe is essential for the discussion in this plenum. For us, without any doubt, the essential problem is whether or not the comrades of the apparatus break with our organisation. Regarding this, a long-standing party tradition has been broken, that of not arguing with anyone without previously specifying whether or not they abide by party discipline under oath. (Maen in all honesty acknowledged this by saying we had the right not to call the plenum.) This break with the party tradition was for two reasons: the historical, emotional, and political importance the figure of Maen has for the party and the leadership and the fundamental, decisive importance the party gives at the current stage to having a solid apparatus, tightly disciplined and linked to its struggles and development. In an effort so that both the apparatus and its undisputed chief continue under the discipline of the organisation, or if a rupture takes place that it takes place on theoretical-political bases of absolute clarity, and not around personal friction. This is why we have broken the party tradition of demanding that before initiating any policy or discussion in a plenum or congress, we require the strictest partisan compliance of those who polemicize.

This exception, this concession is a methodology that is not ours in any of the fields (terrible theoretical-organisational preparation of the discussion, lack of guarantees about the discipline of the comrades who argue), it cannot continue for another minute after my report. That is why this will end with a series of proposals that return the life of the party to a normal situation.

Let's avoid the false problems raised in the discussion with the Castroist comrades

There is a set of small and large problems, falsely posed, that refuting or discussing them leads us to a dead end. These false problems have to do not only with a misinterpretation of our positions and our trajectory but also with that of the comrades who are totally Castroists or Guevarists. In an attempt to carry out an exhaustive understanding of the position of Guevara and the Castroist comrades, we will begin by pointing out several problems regarding the positions of Che Guevara himself. It is common to attack Che and the comrades who support guerrilla warfare as the only revolutionary strategy and method for Latin America of ignoring the mass movement, the class struggle, and the political problem. We will not fall under any circumstances into this false problem and this false discussion since we know perfectly well, and we have plenty of quotes to prove it, that Che Guevara gives fundamental importance to the mass movement, to the class struggle and the political problem. Of course, he does not give it in the same way as we do, or linked to the same strategy, but systematically Che Guevara and his orthodox, or we would better say dogmatic supporters give fundamental importance to the mass movement, to the class struggle and the need for a revolutionary policy concerning the mass movement and the class struggle.

Let there be no confusion: when arguing with comrades who share this position, our attack is not to this aspect of the problem that we know and vindicate as a success of the Guevarist position. But, just like we, in all honesty, avoid looking for quotations or partial elements in Che's numerous documents to pose the false problem, whether or not he gives importance to the mass movement, the class struggle, and the political problem, and we do make an effort to understand the whole of his position and the totality of his positions without isolating any of his quotes from the totality of his activity and his theoretical works, we ask for the same treatment regarding our positions. We want the same responsible and loyal polemic. We do not want the following attacks — which we have heard from R. Rojo and Valeta and from many dogmatic and orthodox Castroist or Guevarist intellectuals — to be raised about us. First attack: that we do not propose the armed struggle and the need for an adequate apparatus. Second attack: that we do not have an insurrectional strategy to fight

for power. Third attack: that we are against the guerrillas and especially that we have been against the guerrillas in Peru. These three attacks are totally and absolutely false. Regardless of whether it is taken out from a quote from our works. The whole history of our movement shows that all three attacks are false.

Let's look at the history of our party taken as a whole in what has to do with the armed struggle, the military apparatus and the guerrillas.

1) As of the year 1957, when the stage of the great general strikes began, the party exhaustively discussed the need for an organisation for the armed struggle and the party leadership accepted the need to face the inevitable armed struggles of the mass movement, creating workers' militias through union leaderships and through the organisation itself. It is an extraordinary historical merit of Comrade Fucito⁴ to have stated this was the permanent task of the party and that an apparatus was required that, even in times when the problem of insurrectional general strikes was not raised, would continue to work with that goal. It is one of the biggest mistakes of my political life to have disagreed with Comrade Fucito at that time and to have thought that only when we gave the line that we were entering the process of general strikes, closely linked to the workers' vanguard, should we structure that apparatus. This very serious mistake on my part and this colossal historical success by Comrade Fucito has not been remembered by anyone at all. On my account and with great joy, I have recalled this stage of our party.

2) The second stage of our party, in what has to do with the armed struggle, arises driven by me and in turn, I was guided, oriented and awakened to the need for a permanent apparatus that will address the armed struggle, the possibility of the guerrillas, by the revolutionary intellectual who will never be sufficiently praised by our party, AG [Abraham Guillen].⁵ He is the one who convinces me of the need for a permanent apparatus and to organise the party and prepare it permanently for armed struggle and even for the possibility of guerrillas. Through me, the party begins to consider the permanent need for armed struggle, of guerrillas in the Northwest, and this is how the party begins to organise its apparatus and to theoretically study the problem of the guerrilla and the armed struggle with the seriousness that characterises it and to carry it out.

3) The first stage is studied exhaustively by comrade Maen and by me, and Comrade Alonso [Daniel Pereyra] is given the leadership of the practical application of this process. Comrade Alonso gives an exaggeratedly theoretical tone to the preparation of the apparatus and the armed struggle and it is Comrade Maen who, in a famous discussion within the Political Bureau, defeats the position of comrade Alonso and myself of a theoretical praxis within the apparatus and points out that the practice has to be concrete regarding the armed forces of the reaction. No apparatus can be structured if it is not facing the armed forces of the reaction every day. In all honesty at that time, in that same Political Bureau meeting, I point it out today, I recognised the comrade was totally and absolutely right from the philosophical, political and personal point of view and I completely changed my position. Along with this, we reached a series of fundamental conclusions, which we elaborated between comrade Maen and myself, which were later adopted by the entire party and which we essentially synthesised in two works: *The Latin American Revolution*⁶ and *Peru: Two Strategies*. These general theoretical positions were the following:

4 **Hector Fucito** (alias Rodin) was a leader of *Palabra Obrera* and led a faction in August 1959 at the first congress of *Palabra Obrera*, which posed positions of capitulation to the leading Peronist bureaucracy of the 62 Organisations. Moreno and Vasco led the debates against the "Rodin faction". Fucito withdrew from the party with some other comrades and died shortly after, in 1960, in a car accident.

5 **Abraham Guillen** (1913-1993) was a Spanish anarchist leader, theoretical and practical promoter of the urban guerrilla, intellectual and university professor. He was a leader of the CNT and when the revolution was defeated by Franco, he was imprisoned in 1939. He managed to flee in 1942. In 1948 he arrived in Argentina and joined John W. Cooke and Peronism. He actively participated in clandestinity in the acts of sabotage of the Peronist resistance after the fall of Peron. At the end of 1959, he was part of the Uturuncos guerrilla group, which was quickly dismantled in Santiago del Estero. In 1961, he went to Cuba, where he spent a year as a guerrilla trainer. In Uruguay he was the inspiration and founder of Tupamaros, and also of the Peronist guerrillas. After Franco's death he returned to Spain. He was a writer, university professor, and journalist, with more than 50 published books.

6 Available for downloading from www.nahuelmoreno.org.

a) that the armed struggle under no circumstances could be the same from country to country. The character of the armed struggle changes with the change in the social structure, revolutionary tradition and process of the class struggle;

b) that in some places there could be guerrillas and in others not;

c) that the armed struggle is always closely linked to the process of the class struggle, that there was not a single method of armed struggle, for example, the guerrilla, or a single strategy, the guerrilla war;

d) that, in this sense, a colossal development of the party was indispensable before embarking on the armed struggle that would allow the structuring of a regional echelon, a name that we gave to the strengthening of the party. Regional echelon which would allow accompanying with a great class struggle, whether peasant or worker, the process of the armed struggle from its beginnings;

e) that the vanguard and the revolutionary zones of a country varied from stage to stage of the revolutionary process and we should not make a fetish of any class or region.

4) Having done this theoretical analysis of a general kind, we proceed to the practice, to execute our theoretical conclusions.

This practical application plays at both ends in Latin America and the country. In Latin America we considered the country in the vanguard was Peru, pointing out that the revolutionary axis passed through Cusco; with the peasantry that was the most backward and exploited sector and we gave the general line of the possibility of a mass insurrectionary process in Cusco, either by taking the city of Cusco or by doing guerrillas. All this, together with Comrade Maen. Our battle in Peru against comrade Alonso was for the immediate beginning of armed struggles; guerrillas or armed defence of the lands, either of the two variants or combined, supporting the development of the mass movement and the peasant unionisation. Specifically, both Comrade Maen and I fought a great battle for guerrillas or armed defence of the lands in Peru.

Our fight against putschism was because putschism prepared, organised, disciplined, and planned the armed struggle independently of the experiences of the mass movement. It was not a battle against the guerrillas, it was a battle against what we considered the strategy of guerrilla warfare, which was to prepare a nucleus of 20 or 30 vanguard comrades to learn the guerrilla technique and for them to apply it in any geographical area, without taking into account at all the process of the class struggle, the country and the region. We believed otherwise, that the entire armed struggle, including the guerrillas, should start from the level of the class struggle within the country and within the region. In our country, we responded that Tucuman was the vanguard of the Argentine revolutionary process and we turned all our efforts there, to prepare the regional echelon. We filled the area with professionals and the possibility of guerrillas began to be studied.

5) The putschist deviation in Peru, fiercely fought by Comrade Maen and myself, led to a party disaster everywhere; in Peru, Argentina and throughout the Latin American organisation. We went into a crisis that lasted about a year to a year and a half. As soon as we began to overcome this crisis, it was the immediate concern of the Secretariat to restructure the apparatus again and prepare for the armed struggle both in Peru and here. This is how the party's military apparatus is structured without the presence of Comrade Maen. His oath is prepared and he begins to develop it. He is given all the money available to start his first job, which was to try to protect Hugo Blanco. We do not want to discuss here whether the tactic was correct or not since what we want to emphasise is whether we permanently pose the problem of the apparatus and the armed struggle. At that time a resolution is adopted without the presence of Comrade Maen, that the task of the comrades is not essentially in Peru but in Argentina because the armed struggle and the apparatus have to be developed here. And along with this the thesis that has been published in *Estrategia*, which is the first letter, is elaborated.

When Comrade Maen arrives, seeing that the comrade emphasises his total compliance with the organisation, he is presented with the theses that have been elaborated, which undergo small modifications — the modification of one of its theses, the one that has to do with strategy and tactic.

Comrade Maen is given the leadership of the apparatus and the party's greatest monetary efforts are made to strengthen the apparatus, considering that having it and preparing for the armed struggle is the most important activity of the organisation. Comrade Maen contributes his thesis which is approved and a Central Committee approves both documents. In other words, the history of our movement shows categorically that we have given fundamental importance to the armed struggle and to the need to have an apparatus and that we have never been against the guerrillas, either in Peru or anywhere else, regardless of what isolated quotes may say.

Regarding the accusation that we do not have a strategy of a power struggle, we can say the same thing. We have permanently had a strategy of struggle to achieve power for the working masses. When Peron resigned, we raised the workers' militias and the government of the CGT. When Peron fell and the defensive stage began, we raised defending the internal commissions and delegate committees and reconquering the unions to, from there, start the struggle for power through insurrectionary general strikes. When this stage began, we raised for the unions and the CCT to prepare general strikes with an insurrectionary nature and the creating of an armed apparatus to guarantee the insurrectionary victory of the strikes. Later on, we accepted the defensive stage as such again and the problem of power was transformed into a propaganda problem. That is, you can disagree with our *strategy* for taking power but not ignore that it exists and that it always was and is revolutionary. Destruction of the repressive apparatus of the regime through the actions of the masses.

It would be misleading to believe that profound differences were not hinted at or expressed, more or less openly, which we honestly believe continue to exist. To clarify those differences, which we do not know whether they are with the comrades of the apparatus, with some of them, or only with their leadership, we want to point out the differences we have with Che Guevara and those who orthodoxly follow him without making any direct controversy.

The real theoretical, practical and political discussion with the Guevarists

Che and his disciples (we are not making a judgment on whether the comrades are his disciples or not) begin by making a general proposal in their work, the same for all Latin American countries. This general proposal is part of three fundamental premises. First, one of a *social* nature: that the peasantry is the vanguard or the axis of the revolution of all Latin American countries or the Latin American Revolution as a whole. This premise is accompanied by a *geographical* one, expressed categorically. I do not want to bore comrades with quotations — although I can contribute them — that the appropriate areas to start the revolutionary process are the least worked by man. They will be the centre of the revolution and the preparation for the seizure of power and the destruction of the Armed Forces of the oligarchy and imperialism. And finally, a *strategic*, fixed, immovable premise, subdivided, on the other hand, into three fixed and immovable strategic stages.

Like us, they start from a principled proposal that makes us consider ourselves to be from the same revolutionary current: they hold that it is essential to take power and for this, there is no other method than the insurrection to destroy the repressive apparatus of the regime, the police and the army. The difference comes around the strategic premise and those three fixed and immovable stages. These three strategic stages (as Che calls them) are: First, what you always have to do is organise a guerrilla group. Second, later, what always has to be done is to organise a revolutionary army to oppose it head on to the counter-revolutionary army. Third, only when we have a revolutionary army can we defeat the reaction and the counter-revolution in the cities and penetrate them, defeating the oligarchic army and imperialism. These three stages, for Che and those who follow him, are inexorable. Through them, and only them, we will destroy the apparatus for the repression of the regime in Latin America.

Politics, the class struggle and the mass movement, everything, is subject to these three stages, which are fundamental and which must be carried out with that rhythm and with that method.

What do we say? First of all, a problem with the method. We believe that the revolutions of each of the Latin American countries have neither the same methods nor the same geographical approach, nor the same social approach, nor, least of all, the same three strategic stages. On the contrary, we believe that the combination of stages, of strategic objectives, of geographical areas, of exploited social sectors, proletariat and peasantry, will vary from country to country and from stage to stage of the class struggle. That is, we believe each revolution will have its specific ways of destroying the repressive apparatus of the regime and of taking power by revolutionary methods. These specific forms will never conform to the schema of: first, the guerrilla group, second, the revolutionary army, and third, the defeat in the cities, as proposed by Che.

Second, we raise a historical problem of the world experience. Never in any country in the world, where there was a victory through the strategy of guerrilla warfare, have the three stages taken place as proposed by Guevara. What always existed in all these countries is a previous stage of formation of a mass party, which already existed before the start of guerrilla warfare. Not only the existence of a mass party but the existence of neighbouring, bordering countries that helped the guerrilla war with everything. In other words, to date, no guerrilla group has succeeded without the prior existence of a large mass party and permanent support from neighbouring countries. The other historical experience is that the counter-revolutionary armies have been easily destroyed through mass actions and propaganda, when these armies are permanent and reflect society as a whole, they destroy themselves when confronting the mass movement, as demonstrated by all the armies that faced the Russian Revolution after 1917. A different situation occurs when armies do not reflect society but are mercenaries or foreigners. Che ignores these facts, hence his conception of the Latin American armies. You cannot do anything about them, at most to individually win some of its members. Only the three inexorable stages destroy the army.

But to not make a historical discussion that we do not want, we will concede that it was not like that in Cuba. Although, for us, Cuba is the most obvious confirmation of this historical experience. And even if Cuba were an exception to the historical experience, we are against that the inexorable course of the revolution in the Latin American countries will follow the stages of the Cuban revolution. Regarding the social premise that the peasantry is the vanguard or the axis of the revolution, we also believe this varies from country to country. Today this is true of Peru. But we do not believe it is true of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia, nor of Venezuela. That is, for us, in Latin America the sector of the class at the vanguard of the revolution varies from stage to stage, from country to country. It may be the proletariat, the semi-proletariat, the peasantry, the lumpens, the semi lumpens, and the urban petty bourgeoisie. And we do not have any rigid schema regarding this problem. We have categorically raised this in our theoretical works. The Cuban revolution has shown that any exploited sector of class can be the vanguard of the revolution.

We are, therefore, against Che's most important theoretical conclusions, which are: *only the peasantry is the vanguard or the revolutionary axis in Latin America*. Regarding the proposition that the geographical areas less worked by man are the centre of the revolution, we believe the same as regarding the other points: it varies from country to country. Let's look at an example from our country to clarify the differences. According to Che Guevara's concept, the northwest, the forested area of Salta and Jujuy, almost uninhabited by man, or by indigenous tribes, are the most suitable for the revolutionary process and should be the axis of the Argentine revolution. In contrast to this, we believe that the process, the centre of the revolutionary process in the north, goes through Tucuman, which is the area most worked by man. That is, we do not have any metaphysical schema concerning geography, nor concerning the other points.

We believe that a concrete study of each area, of each country, is essential to point out which is the most important area from the revolutionary point of view. Of course, we point out that as the axis of the revolutionary process, its decision will always be made in the economically most important area but it can begin in the weaker areas, although also important, of the capitalist chain of a country.

For us, politics does not have tactical importance as it has for Che, but a principled one, as is the strengthening of the revolutionary party that will carry out this policy. Without a strong revolutionary party supported by the mass movement and without a correct programmatic policy based on an exhaustive study of the economic-social reality of the country, there is no possibility of destroying the apparatus of the regime and bringing the working masses to power.

For us, it is not a strategic objective to build first a guerrilla group and then a revolutionary army and that this army carries out a deadly war against the counter-revolutionary army. For us, the strategic or essential objective is to achieve a strong revolutionary party supported by the mass movement that has a correct policy. There have been comrades who have responded to this proposition by taking what we were the first to point out, that we should not make a fetish of the word party and that a revolutionary army is also a revolutionary party. We accept this proposition that we insist again, we have been the first to do so, provided it is accepted that only the study of the reality of each of the Latin American countries is what can lead us to the conclusion that the only way to build the revolutionary party is by creating a revolutionary army. However, please do not tell us that the only way to structure a mass party is by making a guerrilla group first, the army later, and in a third stage the frontal struggle in the cities. We believe the opposite, first, it is the construction of the party and the study of reality to give us a program and based on the study of that reality and the development of the party, only then, we can say whether the development of the party goes through the initiation of guerrillas, which it would lead us to the creation of an army or workers' and peasants' militias or the development of terrorism or the formation of a party apparatus. In other words, to the thousand variants that the armed struggle can have and not only to the fixed and immovable scheme of Che and the guerrillas.

To summarise our positions, first, we fully agree with Che that our great tasks are the destruction of the oligarchic forces and the seizure of power by the working masses and that there are no other means to achieve this than the revolutionary armed struggle. Second, that we do not believe under any circumstances that the stages of this armed struggle and the achievement of those objectives are the three inexorable stages that he points out: a) creation of a guerrilla group; b) creation of a revolutionary army to confront the counter-revolutionary army; and c) war in the cities.

Third, for us, the most important task for achieving the destruction of the armed forces is the development and strengthening of the revolutionary party, that is, our organisation and the development and strengthening of the class struggle and not the other way around, that all this serves only to strengthen the formation and development first of the guerrilla group, later of the revolutionary army.

Fourth, we do not believe that the revolutionary party is always confused with the revolutionary army, rather we believe that the great task is the formation of great revolutionary parties linked to the mass movement that prevents the vanguard from isolating itself from the mass movement. For us, the armed struggle must accompany the experiences, the development, the organisation, the state of consciousness of the masses, not ignoring any sector of the mass movement.

Fifth, the permanent army can be defeated through mass action and propaganda without going through the three inexorable stages of Guevara.

This is not an abstract discussion but one of fundamental importance since it has to do with the future of the revolution in each of our countries. As the concrete experience of the Salta guerrilla group⁷ or Tacuara⁸ or the news from Brazil show us today. We need to answer categorically whether or not the strategy of the Salta guerrilla group is correct. Whether or not the experience of the Tacuara group is correct. Because all of them claim the teachings and the theory of Che Guevara and, like them, there are thousands and thousands of vanguard elements who are risking their necks on

7 **Salta guerrilla group**: sponsored by Che, in Oran (Salta) in 1963 a guerrilla focus began to be organised, headed by the journalist and former director of the *Prensa Latina* news agency in Havana, Jorge Masetti. They were detected by the army and eliminated.

8 The **Movimiento Nacionalista Tacuara** (Tacuara Nationalist Movement) was a fascist far-right Argentine political organisation which acted between 1957 and 1966 and in the years 1961-1965 as neo-Nazis. Later, they were part of Peron's "special formations".

these three inexorable stages of the Guevarist revolutionary strategy. They are in the previous stages of the structuring of the guerrilla groups and are decimated by the imperialist reaction, which is later attributed to technical or organisational errors. We raise the question of whether it is because of technical or organisational errors, such as the case of the campaign to prevent elections in Venezuela and later prevent Leoni from taking office,⁹ or these tremendous disasters of the revolutionary vanguard in Latin America result from an overall conception that are the three inevitable stages of the Guevarist strategy for the revolution in each of the Latin American countries.

Comrade H from the north told me in a personal conversation that Che's article published in *Estrategia* seemed formidable to him. I asked him a series of questions: Where in this theoretical article is the current situation in Brazil foreseen? If this situation was not foreseen, is there any use for a theoretical article on Latin America that does not foresee the pre-revolutionary situation of half of Latin America? Does Che's specific analysis of the Latin American armies confirm what happened in Brazil? Does [illegible] was pointed out by us those perspectives that are taking place in Brazil? And, finally, what is the fundamental thing in Brazil? Is it to organise the guerrilla group in the zone less worked by man, or, on the contrary, to organise a revolutionary party that works everywhere, giving fundamental importance to the class or zone that is at the vanguard, in this case, a sector of the urban middle class such as the non-commissioned officers?

The strategy of the Argentine revolution at this stage

Our general strategy for the Argentine revolution has to start from the following assumptions: First, the essential axis of the Argentine revolution will be the proletariat or semi-proletariat and not the peasantry.

Second, the most important geographical areas for the Argentine revolution will be urban areas, especially three: the littoral,¹⁰ the centre, and the northwest.

Third, the great problem is not the creation of a revolutionary army but how to strengthen our organisation and achieve a single party of the Argentine revolution, uniting all revolutionary tendencies.

Fourth, we must lead a relentless struggle within the mass movement to liquidate its treacherous and opportunistic leaderships and win its leadership.

Fifth, we must fully participate in the defensive struggles of the workers' movement to transform them into offensive struggles. To achieve all this, we must start from a premise: our party and apparatus must guarantee that the entire defensive struggle in our sphere of influence is a true pitched battle that polarises the entire workers' movement, the area and, if possible, the country.

Sixth, full use of legality to develop outbreaks of workers' power, the strengthening and penetration of the party in the workers' movement and that the legality be suppressed by the bourgeoisie and imperialism in the face of workers' mobilisation and not for adventurous action of us.

Seventh, within this process of active defence and revival in which the workers' movement has entered, it will continue to accelerate until it becomes a power struggle. To study, based on the latest reports, whether we return to our old plan to transform Tucuman and its working class in the

⁹ In January 1962, in Venezuela, a group of 20 armed men began to operate, with the leaders of the CP Douglas Bravo and Teodoro Petkoff at the head. A year later, the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) were founded, uniting several groups, which carried out all kinds of violent actions of terrorism, sabotage, seizure of ministries and radio stations, attacks against President Betancourt and other very bloody events. The army responds with fierce repression. In November 1963, the FALN launched an electoral boycott and a general strike that failed. In December, in normal and massive elections, Raul Leoni of Democratic Action was elected. The FALNs went into decline and crisis and had practically become extinct by the end of the 1960s. An important sector agreed to the surrender of weapons and an amnesty in 1969.

¹⁰ The Argentine **littoral** is a region formed by the provinces bordering the Parana River: Misiones, Formosa, Chaco, Corrientes, Entre Rios, and Santa Fe.

vanguard of the party, adopting all the previous steps taken in this regard. Specifically, our strategy for the seizure of power repeats, at a richer and broader historical scale, the strategy we had for 1956 when we concentrated on defending the partial, atomised, molecular struggles of the workers' movement to save their union organisation and we proposed that as soon as a series of victories were achieved in this arena, the recovery of the union organisation of the whole workers' movement would be posed and the stage of insurrectional strikes would open that would pose the issue of power.

Our strategy for the seizure of power is, at a much higher historical scale and with an infinitely superior preparation on our part, part of that experience of 1956. We believe that as soon as there are several defensive struggles of fundamental importance where the workers' movement triumphs, there will be a colossal offensive mobilisation of the latter, which will raise once again the problem of power. At that time, we will raise it sharply as we have always done. Meanwhile, there is no other alternative than to raise it propagandistically.

Our Party

Ultimately, the profound difference between Che and us revolves around the importance and role of the revolutionary party in this revolutionary stage. We believe that without a revolutionary party linked to the mass movement there will be no guerrilla tactic, no guerrilla warfare strategy, no coherent armed struggle with the possibility of victory. Che believes the fundamental thing is to structure the revolutionary army, not the party, starting from the guerrilla group. We believe that in Argentina the only support base for this revolutionary party, linked to the mass movement, is our organisation. Although today we are not a revolutionary party closely linked to the mass movement, for profound objective reasons which are that the Argentine masses were defeated on two historical occasions when they outlined an independent class course, the meatworkers strike of 1945 and the metalworkers' strike of 1956, which if they had won would have changed the course followed by the workers' movement and would have allowed us to transform ourselves into a revolutionary party of the masses. Despite these profound objective reasons, which prevented our party from becoming a revolutionary mass party, we are without a doubt the only party linked to the vanguard of the workers' movement. Today it is proposed for our party, and this is the only discussion we want to carry out in this meeting, how to accompany the struggle of the masses and organise the vanguard to accompany those struggles of the masses through the armed struggle.

This discussion to see how we face the armed struggle, not to see whether we carry it out or not because on this we have totally agreed for years, this political, theoretical, strategic discussion, which can only be carried out by those comrades who have previously accepted these basic principles. Ours is the only organisation that can organise the armed struggle in the country and the struggle for power because of its program, theory, cadres, leadership, its bonding with the workers' movement and its vanguard, and its tradition. And this basic premise is independent of the tactical, strategic or technical differences that exist with the leadership of our organisation. We will continue the discussion only with those who accept this basic principle and this premise: that our organisation is currently the only possibility to face the Argentine revolution. In short, we are against discussing for discussion's sake the problems raised by Comrade Maen. As we are also against discussing in a disorganised way. We want to discuss with those who make partisan patriotism, of its discipline, a fundamental principle.

Hence the nature of the resolutions that I will propose.¹¹ For those comrades who do not accept this premise, who we know are honestly and deeply revolutionary, the only thing we can say to you as a momentary farewell is that, as revolutionaries, as honest revolutionaries, we wish you the best of success in your experiences and from now on we anticipate that whether yours, ours or an intermediate path is the correct one, for us you will be the great revolutionaries that you were all your lives.

¹¹ The proposals took the alternatives A) and B) of Moreno's letter to Bengochea. Refer to page 7 of this work.