



Nahuel Moreno

Anti-Identikit

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Foreword

The paper that became known as *Anti-Identikit* is a reproduction of a long speech by Nahuel Moreno from a meeting held in Bogota, Colombia, in mid-1981 with Comrade Eduardo Exposito (who died in August 2008), who was at that time the lynchpin of the PST secretariat in clandestinity. Moreno had gone into exile in Colombia in July 1976, after the genocidal dictatorship was imposed in March of that year. The PST had been banned by one of the first decrees of the military junta and had been operating underground since then.

The name *Anti-Identikit* responds to the fact that the focus of the exchange was Moreno's criticism of an internal PST bulletin whose aim was to orientate the party with the "profile" that the militants adopt act in the struggle against the military dictatorship and how to make the party grow. The word "profile" was also taken to mean what the "identikit" should be, the way of presenting ourselves that would identify us to the workers and the anti-dictatorial fighting vanguard. That is why, to be more graphic, the term "*Anti-identikit*" was used in the publication of the transcript. In Argentina, this paper was published for the whole party in a camouflaged bulletin.

The discussion in this meeting is an example of how Nahuel Moreno and our current operated, making clear discussions with the cadres and the rank and file of the party. It was the method that Moreno always instilled in the formation of the cadres and leaders, even in the most critical moments of the party's history in full clandestinity under a genocidal dictatorship.

They were important and tough exchanges, to combat errors or conjunctural deviations, which were made in a fraternal manner between leaders and which, after agreeing, were taken to the rank and file.

In this case, the *Anti-Identikit* corrects and correctly positions how to propagandise and present to the working class and its vanguard the class and revolutionary socialist character of the party. This is reflected in important parts of Moreno's speech, correcting the wrong definitions of the internal bulletin mentioned, that we should be identified as "the party of all struggles" or the "party of the resistance to the dictatorship". Moreno makes methodological and political corrections. One of them is that the strength and presence of the party was exaggerated since it couldn't be in "all the struggles". Moreover, that expression led to ignoring the existence of other forces in the resistance, which could weaken our policy of unity of action with other reformist or leftist groups.

But above all, Moreno refused to identify ourselves only as the "party of the resistance", contrasting it with the profile that we are "the party that proposes to defeat the dictatorship with mass insurrectionary methods". He suggested bringing it down to earth, reclaiming our old slogan of the "Argentinazo", considering that it is the best synthesis that can identify us. The PST had launched this slogan based on the characteristics of the process prior to Peron's return, which had the weakness that "they only produced Cordobazos, Rosariazos, etc., meaning that an insurrectional process of national scope, including Buenos Aires, was never achieved". Twenty years later, this slogan of the PST became a reality. In December 2001, there was finally a popular rebellion called the "Argentinazo", which ended up toppling the government of the Radical Fernando De La Rúa and his minister Domingo Cavallo. This semi-insurrection, without revolutionary leadership, could not move towards a change of workers' and popular power. But it was an immense event that will remain in the history of the workers and popular movement as a precedent for the future Argentine socialist revolution.

Moreno also insists on not losing the strategic program of being an internationalist party in the struggle for a world socialist revolution. There is a substantial part of the speech on what should be the “profile” in that sense. Moreno sharply criticises that in the internal bulletin it is defined “that these points define the political profile of our party as that of resistance and socialism, that is, as the most important current fighting for the formation of the great socialist party that the Argentine masses are needing.” On page 12 and in several other places, they mistakenly say that it is positive that we are identified with Mitterrand’s socialist current: “...secondly, the recognition that in our country this current is represented by us (...) the great party of resistance which is part of this world current.”

Nahuel Moreno points out very clearly: “We are not the expression in our country of Mitterrand’s ‘current’ but a mortal enemy of Mitterrand’s Second International. Exactly the opposite of what we say in the bulletin.” This correction from 1981 is very substantive and important. Because years later we are going to meet Trotskyist currents, like the PTS (Trotskyist Fraction-TF) and the Partido Obrero, both from Argentina, that slander and distort Nahuel Moreno, accusing him of “turning to the right”, of “adapting to bourgeois democracy” and that his party project in the 1980s (from the PST in the 1970s and then the MAS) was “an expression of the left of the uprising as socialists, which was taking place with the PSOE in Spain and with the French SP of Mitterrand” (“The crisis of the MAS, lessons for the present”, article by Matias Maiello, leader of the PTS, 16 December 2018, in *Izquierda Diario*). This categorical intervention by Nahuel Moreno on the *Anti-Identikit* in 1981 (as soon as Mitterrand assumed the presidency of France) and the subsequent trajectory of the Morenoist current in Argentina, make clear the lies and slander produced by sectarianism, in this case, the PTS and the PO, and the marginality of the Trotskyist movement. Neither Nahuel Moreno nor his current, after he died in 1987, became social democrats, nor did they vindicate social democracy, nor did they adapt to bourgeois democracy. On the other hand, Moreno always fought against these nauseating methods which prevent political and theoretical debates. He always insisted on clear, serious, documented discussions, without falsifying or misrepresenting and with loyalty among comrades, both internally and towards the other Trotskyist currents.

The *Anti-Identikit* is a pedagogical work on revolutionary politics in the face of a genocidal dictatorship, on how to elaborate slogans without losing the strategic and revolutionary party-building program. Among other things, it insisted on not losing the democratic slogans that are key to driving mass mobilization: “Down with the dictatorship! For democratic elections! For a Constituent Assembly! For the preparation of an insurrectionary general strike to overthrow the government”.

In the last part, Moreno insists, categorically, on the questions of method in the political and party elaboration of leadership. He insisted on not improvising: “Every advance must be made with leaden feet by studying the classics and reality. We must attach fundamental importance to the resolutions voted by the party, and adhere strictly to them. We must religiously respect the resolutions, constantly say ‘the congress voted for this, the CC voted for that, this question is enriched by this’, and apply them religiously.”

Undoubtedly, *Anti-Identikit* is an educational text and almost obligatory reading for the new generations of revolutionary socialist militant comrades.

Miguel Sorans

6 February 2025

(All notes are by the editors.)

Anti-Identikit

Nahuel Moreno (NM): When I read this internal bulletin, I realised that we had all the elements to make a good discussion about many of the problems that concern us about the national situation since when your position is written down, the debate becomes more precise. And even more so, when Eduardo recommended it to us, so we could see how well it applied the orientation of the last Central Committee (CC), which consisted of having as the axis of party activity the sale of the newspaper.

He said that through this weekly bulletin, we would notice how that great goal voted at the beginning of the year was correctly applied.

First, to avoid useless arguments about whether this bulletin is important and reflects the orientation of the secretariat or whether it is a bulletin without major significance, let us agree on its meaning. At the beginning, it says: “This bulletin aims to guide the party’s activity, starting with regional and team leadership, and all cadres who carry out important activities. In this sense, we consider its reading mandatory, it must be carefully studied and discussed in successive meetings, beginning with those of the directorate.”

Do we agree that, according to what I just read, the purpose of the bulletin goes beyond that of a mere weekly bulletin? Yes, or no? After what I have just read, I say to you that this is almost a CC or Congress document, a document of general orientation for the whole party and a whole period. Yes, or no?

Eduardo from the National Directorate (ND): Yes.

NM: The appearance of this bulletin is providential because it allows us to discuss in depth whether or not the voted lines are being respected in the party, or whether they are changed from week to week. And whether, within the great progress of the last months, this is the “fault” of Eduardo or the Secretariat in general because it is a team and this team is failing. I will not tire of repeating that I was told that the bulletin was to boost newspaper sales as the fundamental task. And when I read it, I found that taking it to the limit serves not to sell a single newspaper more than those we now sell. Anyone who reads it understands we need to do many activities and, among them, the sale of the newspaper is of the tenth order. Maybe I’m confused. We need to have this discussion in a very fraternal way, to clarify and agree if we can. The bulletin is full of correct ideas, of findings, but amid general confusion and eclecticism. If you want, I’ll point it out...

Eduardo: I agree.

NM: If so, we can leave the discussion here. I want to intervene to build up, not to polemise or harm anyone. We can leave the discussion for the CC. But I’m furious with all of you. I think that you don’t read the documents, that you don’t study them, that you have been losing these virtues. It seems to me none of you has feedback mechanisms or that those who have them lose them in Argentina. You become bureaucratic, empirical, and overbearing. I’m afraid you’re riding the high horse. That you don’t know how to be humble. That you are not careful or deliberately put yourself in the background knowing it is essential to form a team where you combine the strengths and weaknesses of each one so that everyone performs better. I have the impression that you have become arrogant, even overbearing, without mechanisms of compensation or feedback to compensate for your

weaknesses. I want everyone, and in particular, you, Eduardo, who are the most important leaders, to have those feedback mechanisms that are sacred.

The bulletin itself shows this lack of feedback mechanisms that allow us to balance our documents and our political behaviour. As a document, it is totally unbalanced. If it is to orient the general activity of the party, and to educate around central problems of activity, it makes no sense to devote almost half of the bulletin to the victory of Mitterrand¹ in France. It is a good decision to give importance to France but the space you have given the subject confuses, and misleads. Because in Argentina there is no mass movement that is about to repeat the French experience. It would have been very positive if one of the editors of the bulletin had been accustomed to writing documents (which is a skill that takes years to learn), to simply say France had to be just a small chapter and that you would have done so.

And I'm just pointing out broad brush things, almost in passing, things that hit. Let's recall that with the bulletin you intended to educate the comrades from the entire party and the periphery for the activity. Let's look at page 15 to go to a secondary aspect, remembering that the comrades are reading it, they are studying it carefully to know what to do.

Just over a third of the bulletin is dedicated to French political issues; five out of 12 pages (we left aside the commemorations). You begin by highlighting the historical importance of Mitterrand's victory and the correctness of the policy of the OCI [Organisation Communiste Internationaliste], the sister organisation in France, which focused all its electoral tactics on "defeating Giscard".² Since it is a bulletin, you don't sufficiently explain the French electoral mechanics and the polemic that took place between organisations claiming to be of Trotskyism. Despite the space used, it is not clear what the explanation you provide has to do with a seemingly anomalous situation that took place in the French election. This election is carried out in two rounds, as we all know. In the first round are present those candidates who are authorised to appear by 500 deputies or councillors. There is no second round if a candidate obtains in the first round more than 50 per cent of the votes. Otherwise, there is a second round to vote only for the two most-voted candidates. You explain very well the correctness of the OCI policy but the polemic is not clear for the comrades who don't know well the French movement. It was much easier and shorter, simply to say in the following way what you say in a somewhat confusing way for a middle cadre or rank-and-file militant.

The discussion in the workers' and Trotskyist movement revolved around the tactics for the first round. Traditionally, Trotskyism and the workers' parties used to vote for their candidates in the first round and for the best-placed of the workers' candidates in the second round. The CP in the previous two elections had voted for Mitterrand, who was the "united left" candidate. The ultra-left organisations presented their candidates. On this occasion, the CP raised its candidate and the left organisations, except the OCI, did the same, totally dividing the left for the first round. There were then two candidates of Trotskyism: Laguillier³ of *Lutte Ouvrière* (LO) and Krivine⁴ of the *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire* (LCR), the organisation of the United Secretariat (USec). We didn't support Laguillier because, as you explained in the bulletin, it was an ultra-leftist, populist organisation that said Giscard and Mitterrand were the same. With the LCR things were a little more complicated. At first, it was proposed to the LCR a campaign with a common candidate for Trotskyism, and around the three slogans, you explain on page 15. Then Krivine withdrew and the LCR raised his candidacy alone. Then we had the talks you told us a lot about whether we were to

1 **François Mitterrand** (1916–1996) was a French politician who served as President of France from 1981 to 1995, the longest holder of that position in the history of France. He was a former Socialist Party First Secretary.

2 **Valéry Giscard d'Estaing** (1926–2020), was a French politician who served as President of France from 1974 to 1981. In 1981, despite a high approval rating, he was defeated in a runoff against Mitterrand, with 48.2% of the vote.

3 **Arlette Laguiller** (b. 1940), from 1973 to 2008, she was the spokeswoman and the best-known leader and presidential nominee of *Lutte Ouvrière* (Workers' Struggle – LO), one of the main Trotskyist parties. In 1981 she had achieved 2.30% as a presidential candidate. She was a Member of the European Parliament.

4 **Alain Krivine** (1941–2022) was a French Trotskyist leader. He was one of the leaders of the May 1968 revolt in Paris, and leader of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), French section of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International headed by Ernest Mandel. He was the candidate of the LCR at the French presidential election of 1969, getting 1.05% of the votes. He was a member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2004.

support Krivine and indeed, we had not only problems in the talks, but Krivine refused to run as a candidate for the Fourth International and did so with a much broader program. All this, together with the need for the results of the first round to be convincing in favour of Mitterrand, and to turn the middle class in his favour in the second round, decided our electoral strategy, which, yes, as you explain correctly, had the aim of driving Giscard out of office and not to make propaganda for us. If Mitterrand received few votes, Giscard would have won.

And then, towards the end, you not only move away from the political explanation you were giving but enter into incoherence. Let's read: "First of all, to be able to present a candidate in France, you have to get the signatures of 500 councillors, not of ordinary people without some position. This means turning to a superstructural activity, on socialist and communist-affiliated members, a huge effort that does nothing to promote a political line. Nor is the use of the media so simple because it requires financial and administrative efforts" (p. 16).

Here the bulletin enters a discussion of electoral mechanics that contradicts itself sentence by sentence and therefore doesn't arm anyone. Getting 500 councillors has nothing to do with turning to the communist and socialist affiliated members, who are millions and this is not a superstructural activity. We have said the opposite in the previous sentence. Getting 500 councillors is not turning to the affiliated members but to the leaders.

Eduardo: Yes, that's why it's superstructural.

NM: Yes, but in the sentence where it says it is superstructural, it is precisely the phrase where it says we must "turn... to the communist and socialist affiliated members". These are formal contradictions, one after another. In the first sentence, we work on "uncommon people", about 500, in the second sentence on the most common, the "affiliated members", millions, but it says to be "superstructural". A coherent person, after reading it, throws himself out a window.

Eduardo: Yes, the mistake is in saying, affiliated members. It should say deputies or something like that because, otherwise, they are millions of people.

NM: That's why. And then it says that it is a huge effort which reaffirms that it has to be about millions and millions because the 500 you can see them with a few militants, as *Lutte Ouvrière* did. Let us dwell on the final part of this second phrase: "a huge effort that doesn't pay off in terms of promoting a political line". That's outrageous! So, the huge effort of presenting our candidates for the elections "does nothing". I believe the exact opposite: it pays off tremendously. This doesn't mean it is always right to stand for election or to make such an effort. Let's keep going. We can continue until the last sentence: "Nor is the use of the media so simple because it requires financial and administrative efforts."

We all know that harnessing the media is not a simple matter but it requires a huge financial effort and technical know-how. But this doesn't justify not running for election. It is not clear where the bulletin wants to go with all these explanations and considerations. The whole bulletin is like this. I marked this paragraph only because here the mental anarchy is very evident; each sentence collides with the other. All your policies and methods are the same as in this paragraph. The bulletin is the best example.

Eduardo: Yes.

NM: Well, as I see that we're agreeing, I'd rather we get into the thick of it. You can have a detailed discussion when you hold the CC meeting. Let's see.

First of all, it seems to me there is a subjectivist, ultra-leftist position in the bulletin, whereby the party is portrayed as stronger than it is. The same is done with the resistance, particularly in the parts of the country where you are. This leads to deviations. For me, neither is the party so strong nor is there so much resistance. There is no mass movement against the government and towards the party or anything like that. Failure to specify this well leads to dangerous and misguided deviations and sometimes it unintentionally borders on opportunism. Let's look at some problems.

When you say: "we want to define the profile of the party. We think there is no clarity among the affiliated members about what are the fundamental positions around which the recruitment

needs to be done and that they are the positions that respond to the imperious needs of the mass movement and its vanguard, which we are bringing closer numerous comrades [...] every comrade must see the party as the party which is identified with a profile in the following points” (p. 11). I think it’s very dangerous. If it is said that the profile only describes the elements with which you present yourself to the masses today within your ignorance, that you are capitulating to a certain extent to avoid falling into maximalism, then it may be correct. That is, if it was written to solve the problem that M. commented on, that there are sectarian comrades who don’t know how to talk to people. But if you want to profile the party, that is, to define what distinguishes the party from other political organisations, then the description is bad. If you say those points characterise the party, you are watering down your program and biasing it, falling into opportunism.

How the party is to be defined

NM: The first point of the profile states categorically:

“1. We are the party that participates in all the struggles, that tries to lead them all to a confrontation with the dictatorship. That is, we are the Party of the Resistance to the dictatorship” (p. 11). And already in the introduction, it said: “... to build the party of the resistance in the country and the revolutionary leadership of the world working class... the party of the resistance is built by actively participating in the resistance. Being in every place where the broad vanguard of tens of thousands resists the plans of hunger, unemployment and repression of the dictatorship” (p. 10). Let’s look at the mistakes.

“We are the party that participates in all the struggles...”. The CP may participate more than you do. The identification is wrong and very dangerous. Almost always the Trotskyist parties are those that participate in fewer struggles in relation to the great majority parties, for a simple matter of relationship of forces. And then, if a small group of comrades is in a country where they are very weak if they “identify” themselves by saying that they are the ones who participate in all the struggles, they are lying. It is not exactly your case since you participated in the struggles in depth but, I doubt very much, “in all”. I know that what you want to say in the bulletin is something else, that you are the most uncompromising fighters, but what is written is that you are the ones who participate in all, “in every and each place” and this is an exaggeration. Let’s stop here because maybe you think this is an abusive interpretation.

Eduardo: No, it’s what you say.

NM: “... that tries to lead them all to a confrontation with the dictatorship. In other words, we are the Party of the Resistance to the dictatorship.” I would accept that it says at this moment you are the only ones confronting the dictatorship, provided you point out that in the great general and historical program of the party, what distinguishes us is not the mere confrontation with dictatorships. In the future, currents may emerge that will confront the dictatorship, which will participate in all the struggles, as happened with the FSLN in Nicaragua, the Shiite Muslims in Iran, or Peronism in Argentina confronting the Aramburu⁵ dictatorship. They could be the Peronists, the Radicals, splits from the union bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy as a whole, the ERP,⁶ Stalinism, or a new petty-bourgeois party. And then we are left with no definition. And the workers are concrete and if we say that and it doesn’t match reality, we will lose people. You have to educate the comrades in the truth and in speaking the truth.

5 **Pedro Eugenio Aramburu** (1903 –1970) was an Argentine Army General. He was a major figure behind the military coup self-named *Revolución Libertadora* (Liberating Revolution) against Juan Domingo Peron in 1955. He became *de facto* president of Argentina from 13 November 1955 to 1 May 1958.

6 **ERP** (People’s Revolutionary Army) was a guerrilla group in Argentina, and the military structure of the *Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores-El Combatiente* (PRT), led by Mario Roberto Santucho, during the 1970s. It emerged in 1967–68 from the factional discussion that split the PRT led by Moreno, which continued as PRT-La Verdad. It was recognised as an Argentine section by the Mandelist majority of the Fourth International (USec) in 1969, as part of its guerrilla deviation. The PRT-ERP broke up in 1972.

J.: That has already happened to us in an important factory where, for saying “we are the only ones” to the striking workers, they sent us packing since who led the struggle and the resistance was a bureaucrat recognised by the workers.

NM: To have as a major slogan “building the party of resistance in the country...”, in a sense is very little. The possibility that if the military government lasts long, other parties of resistance may emerge is not ruled out. Right now, this is certainly true. But it is not what characterises the construction of the party. You are — and this is necessary to clarify it very well — **the party that proposes to overthrow the dictatorship with mass insurrectional methods**. That is, you are the party of insurrectional resistance to the government; because other petty-bourgeois parties or currents of resistance may arise. We always do, for example, comparisons with Nicaragua.

We have said the FSLN was the great party of the resistance to Somoza.⁷ It is not ruled out that the guerrilla currents, mortal enemies of the present government, will become very strong tomorrow. In other words, when painting the picture that you are the only party of the resistance in Argentina you are giving only a variant, which is the present one. But maybe over time, a new electoral or guerrilla resistance to the dictatorship will emerge and then we would confuse the workers. In the eagerness to cling to this current junction, you make an incorrect and non-principled definition of the party.

The party is not characterised by being the party of resistance, even if it is so today in Argentina. The parties with which we sympathise in Nicaragua or El Salvador were not characterised as the only parties of the resistance but rather they were the parties of resistance by way of mobilisation of the masses towards the workers’ and popular insurrection. So is our party in Argentina and everywhere. This is of enormous importance.

Of course, you have to have to be very careful about the way you put forth these proposals. You have experience and should use it. You have even lost the language. For example, a great theoretical, political and agitational conquest was the word “Argentinazo”.⁸ I don’t know why you don’t follow the example and speak of “Argentinazo” since it is the best synthesis that distinguishes you. We had already said the great shortcoming of the mobilisations of the previous stage, their great weakness, was that they only produced Cordobazos, Rosariazos, etc., that is, they never came to an insurrectional process of national scope, that included Buenos Aires. We can perfectly well take these definitions which have been another very important theoretical and programmatic achievement but which you have set aside. It is an essential point for a profile. I would say that now more than ever the struggle between reformism, the bourgeoisie and you revolve around this (“Argentinazo” or not). All of them, even when they resist the dictatorship, want another alternative. Only you want the fall of government through an insurrectional process. And since the resistance aims for that, this is why you are the conscious sector of it.

Well, let’s continue “... the party of the resistance is built by actively participating in the resistance”. This is formally correct but taken in the context of our current policy, as a profile, it is incorrect. The problem is what this “participation” means. Does it mean that the party has to work itself as crazy to be in “all the places” (as the introduction says) “where there is resistance”? This is precisely what the party should not and cannot do. Lenin must be read again. The party’s role is to denounce, to be the great denunciator — centrally, through the newspaper — of the government. The party can never encompass the whole objective reality, which is much more extensive than itself. Resistance is an objective phenomenon and, logically, there will be many expressions of resistance in which the party cannot intervene, intervene late or intervene from the beginning but poorly. Precisely what we

7 **Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza** (1925-1980) was President of Nicaragua from 1967 to 1972 and again from 1974 to 1979. He headed the dictatorship of the Somoza family dynasty (in power since 1937) between 1967 and 1979. He was overthrown by a revolution led by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in July 1979. The current led by Nahuel Moreno participated in the armed struggle against his dictatorship by forming the Simon Bolivar Brigade. Somoza managed to flee Nicaragua and was assassinated in 1980 while in exile in Paraguay.

8 Since the workers’ and popular riots of May 1969 in the city of Cordoba, Argentina became known as “Cordobazo”, it has become common in the Spanish language to append the suffix “azo” to the name of a city or country where other workers’ and popular rebellions have taken place to refer to these rebellions.

have to explain to the party to educate it strongly is that this is a secondary problem. Taking part in the resistance is not an individual, cellular or regional problem but it is a national political problem, which translates into having an organ and a political line that denounces the government. They are two different orientations. One is the one I am giving and the other, the orientation of the bulletin, is the one that leads to economism and even, unintentionally, to reformism, to running after conflicts without a correct policy and a centralising organ.

This is one of the central problems. You must become the party of the resistance without running like crazy to take part in all the pockets of resistance that exist because we are the political-historical expression of this resistance through the party line that is explained in its organs, mainly the newspaper. It is through our organs that we try to connect with the resistance and express it consciously as party politics. The phrase about how to participate in the resistance is just a phrase but I believe we must interpret it in the sense I have said. It is economic and not political due to the little importance that in the profile and in the whole bulletin you give the newspaper and having a correct policy that is based on the millimetric analysis of the rhythms of the resistance, of the different slogans that may arise and combinations thereof. Nowhere in the document is it pointed out that the great way to take part in resistance is to begin by studying it. I don't see you telling your middle cadres "Don't run because running won't get you anywhere, don't kill yourself to take part", although they should take part since the most important thing is the political study to achieve the appropriate slogans for intervention and propaganda-agitation of party politics to popularise the denunciations, facts, and slogans, through its organs.

This is why I insisted so much the other day with a phrase dedicated to "democratic problems". That's the key phrase. I repeat it for the comrades who were not here. "This is the politics of the party in deeds. When we raise our five-point program for unity for the democratic problems we are programmatically channelling a reality. This reality is objective and was manifested in the presence of different sectors in the mobilisation. This is why we say that it is the triumph of our policy" (p. 17). It doesn't say that your great virtue is that for years you have been active there, or that your virtue is that you run like crazy. No, the great virtue was the program, and also that you didn't stop being active. This needs to be raised at the national level. Here it is not said the triumph was because you ran, because you took part, for this or that, but that it is a triumph essentially because you raised a correct program in the face of an objective reality. I think it was a model of politics and we have to take it as an example for the whole party. This is why I warn against the phrase "the party of the resistance is built by actively participating in the resistance", because it gives the whole of the document an economist, voluntarist, pragmatic orientation, and does not have a correct policy and a central organ as a primary task, to express it.

About the international question

NM: Linked to all this about the definition of the party is that phrase on "building the world revolutionary leadership". It is, at least, exaggerated. It is not the Argentine party, although this makes its contribution, which has this task but rather the FI(IC) [Fourth International (International Committee)]. That is, there is another party above the Argentine party, which is called FI(IC). This also seems a mere question of terminology, and it is so in a very important sense because there it doesn't say that the essential characteristic of the Argentine party is to be a "section" or "region" of a world party. Let's suppose that in Rosario, the Rosarian comrades, defining what characterises the Rosario region, answer: to build the party of resistance in Rosario and to be the revolutionary leadership of the Argentine working class. We would criticise them very harshly; we would say they have a provincial deviation. In Argentina, you would see it clearly because you are the leadership. But in the rest of the Americas, they will see it with the same clarity when they read it. They will underline it with a thick red pencil and they won't tell me anything to avoid hurting my feelings but they will think "they are chauvinistic".

Let's get down to the nitty-gritty: nowhere do you state that your program, what distinguishes you, is the world socialist revolution, and in the international point of the profile, you don't even mention the political revolution as such, its importance, its definition, your ties with it. It gives the impression you are internationalists because you support the struggles of the proletariat of the entire world. There is also a deviation of the nationalist and economist type here. Because even the Italian CP says the whole world must unite to fight against the multinationals, the trusts, the monopolies and imperialism, and to be in solidarity with those who struggle. We differentiate ourselves from the other parties because we are the only ones who are fighting for the international socialist revolution.

The same for when it gives the example of Mitterrand's socialism.

On page 12 it says: "In short, these points define the political profile of our party as the party of the resistance and socialism, that is, as the most important current that fights for the formation of the great socialist party that the Argentine masses need." On page 12 and in several other parts, you say it is positive for us to be identified with the socialist current of Mitterrand: "(...) secondly, the recognition that in our country this current is represented by us." "(...) the great party of the resistance that forms part of this world current", that is, the world current of the social-democratic parties. Tell me if I'm confused but it's what I'm reading in the bulletin.

Eduardo: No, Nahuel. It says so.

NM: This has the positive aspect that it is a mistake inherent to the workers' movement in its advance towards class independence. But one thing is the confusion and ideologies of the workers and another thing is ours. We are not the expression in our country of Mitterrand's "current", but a deadly enemy current of the Second International of Mitterrand. Exactly the opposite of what we say in the bulletin.

But there is something serious about these statements as party politics: the bulletin turns the whole weight of the scales in the march towards class independence in the formation of a great socialist party. The party has studied theoretically and politically this problem for some time and has insisted 50 times it should not only bet on the variant of the great socialist party because only the objective reality will decide on this problem. For example, we must consider as a second variation that a Labour Party can happen, which is part also of the national tradition, like the socialist party. And the third variation is a combination, a hybrid formed by the two possibilities — a Socialist-Labour Party.

These mistakes are also serious because they hinder our dialogue with the workers. I don't believe all the workers and the mass movement are already heading towards socialism. Many workers and activists still have doubts about whether Peronism or other nationalist currents are redeemable. If we only raise socialism, we cut off our dialogue with them.

Our weapon in front of them is to ask them why we don't make a workers' party, a party of the toilers, not a socialist party. Provided they build a workers' party with us, we are prepared to accept a majority vote in favour of putting the portrait of any nationalist leader. Like any theoretical question, it is a deeply political and practical problem. It is not a matter of definitions in the clouds. And that all the traditional theorising and program of the party be left aside on account of the triumph of Mitterrand: betting everything on the great socialist party and nothing on the Labour party. Whoever reads and accepts the bulletin is eliminating one of the great theoretical and programmatic achievements of the party; he is falling into the impressionism provoked by the triumph of Mitterrand.

In summary, first, for us, the great world current we want to build and from which we claim to be part of is the FI(IC). It is neither the Argentine party nor the international social democracy. Second, on the national level, by eliminating the variant of the Labour Party, we eliminate the campaign for the political independence of the class, whatever the variant may be. In Argentina, this campaign is a matter of life or death, it is not just any old thing. The last word has not been said. It depends on the development of the class struggle but the party secretariat has settled the matter forever in favour of a single variant. Third, to be seen as part of a world socialist current, the one of

Mitterrand, is good in the frame of the ignorance of the Argentine working class and its very low political level, and it is bad, a danger, that our party identifies itself as a social-democratic party.

Then there is a small detail I want to mention in passing, on the part about France, about the crisis of Gaullism. For me, Gaullism has been in crisis since 1968, and now we have a quantitative expression of the crisis that has become qualitative. Gaullism has appeared always divided since then: in 1969, in 1974. Gaullism went into crisis since de Gaulle⁹ left, as a further consequence of the great general strike of 1968.

There is also an error in the analysis of Mitterrand. In the first part, almost the only thing mentioned is that Mitterrand is the future, and barely at the end, in another section, all the danger that Mitterrand means is pointed out, and he is denounced as what he is, as an agent of the counter-revolution.

About the struggle for human rights and against repression

NM: Let's go to point five, on page 16, which you call "democratic" and refers to the demonstration held in Buenos Aires by the Commission of Support to the Mothers¹⁰ of the disappeared, on 30 April. Here a question of the method appears very clear: We don't have the virtue of empiricism as a moment of the Marxist method, which seeks precision, and rigor in the analysis of the facts. On the page, completely outside the specific point, appears the only description you make of the demonstration. When you touch the subject, you don't remember or worry about telling us what happened, how many people went, what was achieved, or anything of the sort. We don't know what we are analysing. I point this out as a methodological question; whenever the discussion of a problem begins, it is fixed in time, in space, we point out the facts to be analysed; it is the empirical moment of our method, as I have already told you.

Well, we always try to be as precise as possible, taking into account the proportions, and here it says: "This demonstration has been a qualitative leap in the democratic struggle, for the large participation, because there was no repression, for the participation of people in an individual capacity, and it has also achieved a more working-class character because of the participation of a very important factory that collected 1,500 signatures which were sent to the Mothers and the minute of stoppage that took place in the factory itself" (p. 11). This is the only objective description of what happened.

In the chapter dedicated to the topic, on the page, it says: "There is an event in the field of human rights that moved activism and public opinion — the demonstration of 30 [April] in Plaza de Mayo, convened by the Commission of Support to the Mothers. This action was widely commented on by national and foreign press. However, what didn't transcend so much is that it was our party and its policy the great factor (always the same, no adjectives are spared for us) that made it possible to call the most important action against the dictatorship on the democratic front, and it opens the prospect for a new leap with the world week for the disappeared from 24 to 31 May summoned by almost all human rights organisations."

It seems to me an exaggerated definition, although what is said is correct from a certain point of view. What is correct? That it is a qualitative leap to advance from a demonstration of a couple of hundred to one of 1,500 or 2,000. But it is a weak, small leap. Why didn't 15,000 or 20,000 people go? This is the other problem you don't even consider.

⁹ **Charles de Gaulle** (1890-1970) was a French army general and politician who headed the government-in-exile that was installed in London when France was occupied in 1940 by Nazi German troops in the Second World War. In 1958, he led the "Algiers coup", amid the anti-colonial war of the Algerian FLN, took over as prime minister, ended the regime of the Fourth Republic, and reformed the Constitution of France, ushering in the Fifth Republic after its approval by referendum in 1959. He was elected President of France that same year, a position he held until his resignation in 1969, after he lost a referendum.

¹⁰ In 1977, the **Mothers of Plaza de Mayo** began to march every Thursday, with white headscarfs, in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires, in front of the Casa Rosada, demanding for their disappeared children, in a courageous public challenge to the state terrorism of the Videla dictatorship. Their bravery and heroism won them support in the country and the rest of the world. Their central slogan was 'the appearance alive of the disappeared'.

Eduardo: The newspapers said 3,000 and our comrades 2,000.

NM: Well, the first thing to say is that there were only 2,000 people. Second, we have to say it was a factory, but only one, in a country that has tens of thousands of factories, if we take into account the small factories of few workers. From what you say, only one factory supported the demonstration and didn't even attend it. Then, the time comes to think about the story of the glass half full, half empty. Last night thinking about how I would address you today, I said to myself: we have to change the half-glass story because in this case, it is one occupied only in a ten-thousandth part; you can't even see what is inside. Out of millions of people who hate the government and want democracy, only 1,500 went to Plaza de Mayo, and a single factory declared in favour. All this is important because new questions and new issues arise.

Why only one factory? Because the workers' and mass movement has not yet taken as its own the problem of the prisoners and the disappeared and because it has been defeated by the government. Other reasons also explain this, such as the fact that no party — except ours — wanted to support this demonstration. This is important, and it explains why they confine the question of repression, human rights, and the disappeared, to a partial, sectoral struggle of requests and information to the “democrats”, instead of being the main “struggle” of the workers and popular movement, that of achieving democracy in the country.

And we have to say that, unfortunately, against the discussion and categorical voting of the CC in January, the party plays into their hands, keeping “democratic” as a specific, partial sector of its activity. What the party's profile says about “democratic” is false, to say the least: “In the democratic field, we are against the military dictatorship and the lifting of all repressive legislation. Regarding the handling of the disappeared in Argentina, we are those who demand their appearance alive, not for the publication of lists. We are for the unconditional release of all prisoners of the regime, not just for the release of the prisoners of the PEN¹¹ and we also want the state of siege and all the repressive legislation to be liquidated and the validity of the Constitution of 1853 without further amendments. With this program, we managed to get the Commission of Support to the Mothers, and Peace and Justice (led by Perez Esquivel)¹² to join in the public announcement that the CP boycotted” (p. 12).

Where were our slogans for the military dictatorship to leave, for free elections? What about the Constituent Assembly? And the general strike to confront the government? That is to say, the other democratic slogans, apart from “freedoms” and “lifting of the state of emergency and all repressive legislation”, “return alive of the disappeared” and “validity of the Constitution of 1853” that the bulletin does raise. They are not at any point of the profile and are identified with a slogan that is not even of the party and which I will come back to. The central policy of the party has to do — at the present stage, due to the existence of the military dictatorship and combined with the transitional program — with the democratic struggle to overturn the government. This struggle has to reflect the character of the resistance, adapting the organisation and activity of the party to it. Precisely because the democratic struggle is the axis of everything, it is that the parties and the Church want to keep it as a specific campaign against repression and human rights, because where it generalises, it can explode as a democratic struggle against the government. You discussed this in the CC to the point of exhaustion and it is very clear in the national document you approved.

And in the profile of this bulletin, it is radically false to state that for Argentina the distinction from the other parties is to be for the validity of the Constitution of 1853. In the first place, because Radicals, Peronists and others are with the Constitution of 1853. Secondly what identifies the party is that it is for the fall of the government, for free elections and without proscriptions or constraints and for the Constituent Assembly, as stated in the National Document of the Congress.

11 The **prisoners of the PEN** (National Executive Power) refer to detainees without trial who were imprisoned “at the disposition of the PEN”. Within their totally arbitrary situation of imprisonment, they had the option of going into exile, and so did several militants of the PST who had been imprisoned since before the coup.

12 The **Peace and Justice Service** (SERPAJ) is a Latin American Christian movement that promotes peace and human rights through active non-violence. **Adolfo Perez Esquivel** (b. 1931) was the recipient of the 1980 Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to the defence of democracy and human rights in the face of military dictatorships in Latin America.

I believe you didn't start with clarity in your analysis of the fact that the mass movement has not yet taken up the struggle for the prisoners and the question of the disappeared, and you fall into exaggerating the role and possibilities of the party without placing yourselves in all the complexity of this "democratic" problem. I don't think, as the bulletin states, the party is the "big" factor, that is, decisive. Let's not even discuss whether "big" means decisive or not. The fact is you do name no one else and then not even discuss our party remains the most important factor. Starting from the objective analysis of what is happening, as far as the elements we know, I don't think it is so. I think you indeed were a factor of some importance, that you had a correct policy, I don't want to say it again.

The phrase about human rights that I quoted is the one we have to generalise to the whole country — the democratic struggle for the disappeared and imprisoned is an objective process and your merit was to give a program to that process. Here you say something else — the party is the "big factor" in an objective process. You changed the movie. I don't believe that. I believe there is a fight around human rights between the CP and its collaterals on the one hand, and Catholics, anti-CP independent personalities on the other. This last wing, to a certain extent, uses the party, because you are the ones who give it, as an old friend would say, political victuals to confront Stalinism. It is a different analysis from that of the bulletin; which doesn't mean you are not acting well in using these differences. It is good you use these divergences between Stalinism and bourgeois politicians to develop your political course but as long as you are aware you're not the "big factor", those who lead the front of Support to the Mothers or the "democratic" ones but the Christians are. I'm getting ahead of myself because it is on another page but, from all this, you take the line of organising a federation or something like that, independent of the CP and collateral to you. I don't believe you will achieve it, because of all I'm saying.

In summary, for me, there are two movements for the imprisoned and disappeared, one led by the CP and another led by the Catholic Church, to which the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and also the Support Commission respond. The big factor is the Mothers and, through them, the independent and Catholic personalities. This is where the party comes in, doing very well to get involved. You have had a correct policy but within a movement that is objective concerning us. If this is correct, it poses the danger, among other things, of capitulating to this Catholic current.

All this doesn't mean that the demonstration has not been important and a qualitative leap. It was much better than the previous one, different from the previous one.

But, getting back to the discussion, you yourselves acknowledge that those who gave the program of the mobilisation were the Mothers and not the party. If you like, I'll read it: "We took the call and discussed with the Mothers the need to expand it to other sectors, especially Peronism, raising the release of Isabel¹³ and all political prisoners. We also proposed that prisoners at the disposal of the PEN be released or convicted, and also the validity of the Constitution and the lifting of the State of Emergency" (it continues enunciating proposals...). "The Mothers did not see it and insisted on their narrower proposals, the appearance alive of the disappeared; even having these differences we agreed to their proposal..." (p. 17).

So, according to the bulletin itself, you are not the only ones who do everything and nobody does nothing or very little. At the moment of truth, the Mothers and the Support Commission said "wait a minute, we don't accept your program", and so it was. You did well to participate but as long as you accept the characterisation that this movement exists that is independent of you, that you don't lead it, and that you influence it very little. And although there is this very good paragraph on the page, the one I already quoted, you are not consistent with it and you fall into calling yourself the "only ones" and not as what you are, just part of an objective process not led by you.

13 **Maria Estela Martinez de Peron** (b. 1931), better known as **Isabel Martinez de Peron** or **Isabel Peron**, was Peron's third wife and shared his exile in Madrid. When Peron ousted Hector Campora from the presidency and called for new presidential elections, he put her as his vice-presidential candidate on the Peron-Peron ticket, which he won in September 1973. After Peron's death on 1 July 1974, she took over as president. She was overthrown and imprisoned for five years by the civil-military dictatorship that took power on 24 March 1976. Since regaining her freedom, she has lived in Madrid, where she has retired from political activity.

Let's continue analysing what you say: "What must be rescued from this mobilisation is that despite the sectarian politics of the Mothers and the Support Commission, who only want to raise the point of the disappeared, their mobilisation becomes a pole, a channel, the binding factor of all those that have some democratic claim to rise" (p. 17). Again, I don't believe this is the case. For me, it is the entire Argentine people, the entire workers' movement the ones who have "some democratic claim to rise" against this government and I am reluctant to believe that the 1500 people who assisted to the demonstration were the "channel", the "focus", the "binding factor" of millions of Argentines.

It's too big an exaggeration. The demonstration was attended or represented by only a few activists who are specifically dedicated to the problem of the disappeared. In this sense, it was a demonstration of super-vanguard and superstructural.

The policy of the party, in general, was good, in the narrow sense of the word, not taking the newspaper into account. What is unsaid in the bulletin is whether you were successful. There is a serious contradiction, in the general, not narrow, political course of the party. Let's see what you published in your newspaper. It had on the back cover in very large letters the slogan "Everyone to Plaza de Mayo!", and the line you give is that only the "democratic" comrades work on the attendance to the demonstration, not the whole party. This is a serious contradiction and we drilled it into the heads of the comrades. Because of this, there have been problems and poorly framed discussions. You cannot recriminate "you didn't do much for the demonstration", or something like that, to a mid-cadre if you have said it is a specific task of the "democratic" comrades since, surely, we have told that mid-cadre that anyway everyone has to help with the demonstration while continuing to do the usual work in the factory, the neighbourhood, to take part in the struggle in the university, and without forgetting that the main task is to take part in the resistance.

If we say "Everybody to Plaza de Mayo!" but it turns out it is not "everybody" but only those in the "democratic" team and at the same time we tell the workers to fight for wages, the students to fight against university fees, and that nobody fails to get involved in any small dispute there is, it is logical that nobody understands anything at all and flashes of confusion begin to happen.

What you did, if you look at it closely, is to bring confusion to the extreme. If the slogan was "Everybody to the Plaza!", that meant to fully commit the party with everything to achieve a demonstration of 15,000 or 20,000 people. It was an immense, absorbing, and unique task for 15 days or a month, which displaced other tasks. The leadership was responsible since it ceased to be a specific task of the democratic team. The leadership, to say the least, was eclectic.

And apparently, you continued in the confusion regarding what was said about the next mobilisation, which was prepared for late May. I quote: (...) its launch is a huge step forward. It could be higher than the one on 30 April. This is why we must take advantage to extend from below, repeating and extending what was done in Ford or the creation of the Commission of Support to the Mothers of Cordoba. That is, to encourage delegations to the demonstration and that all the regions take it up, selecting the sectors where we will concentrate efforts to deepen and extend the work or where we begin new ones" (p. 18). This had to be studied very carefully to see whether it could be so; because if this was possible, we were only halfway there. We should have been categorical and said: We will push more, much more than last time, making the whole party take it up and not just the democratic team. But, should we have pushed more than last time? I still believe not yet. Although the democratic struggle is general, of all, the working class and the people have not yet taken up the Commission of Support to the Mothers, they have not risen to that level.

There is a danger of far-leftism within eclecticism. For example, there is a danger that the party will follow the Commission of Support to the Mothers with the slogan on the disappeared. It is a serious danger that we separate too much from those who follow Stalinism or nationalism. In several places, you suggest we have to work on the rank-and-file and not on the leadership, as vulgar sectarians. I don't know how the great struggles for democratic slogans regarding repression will take place. For example, the slogan of the disappeared is dangerous. It doesn't mean we don't raise it today. Why is it dangerous? The whole party knows they have all been murdered; that at most two

or three may be alive. Then, it is dangerous to raise a slogan that says that the disappeared, who are dead, appear alive. Every slogan we launch is to win it.

Then, let's see what happens to this one if we take it to the maximum. Assuming we could take the whole country to a general strike, demanding the appearance alive of the disappeared in Argentina and winning the strike, we cannot achieve what the slogan demands. It's impossible.

This doesn't mean I think we should not continue to raise it. On the contrary, we must continue to raise it because it is the battle cry of the struggle of the Mothers of Argentina against the slogan of the Stalinists who play into the hands of the government. This is fine as long as we don't capitulate to the Mothers, and on the condition that we look for other slogans more suitable for this struggle. Let's study whether it can be a "list of those murdered and appearance of the disappeared who are still alive" so the Mothers can judge the murderers or something similar. This acceptance of the lists allows us to propose unity with the movement led by the Stalinists. Because it seems to me there is another problem: that you are going out on a branch by yourselves, that there is a far-leftist, voluntarist deviation. You have abandoned or never considered as your highest objective the unity of action with Stalinist organisations for human rights and all sectors other than yours to confront repression. Unity of action to begin to raise "yes to the lists" if this is the point that unites them to the other movement. Understand that I think it would be a tactical mistake to abandon the "appearance alive" slogan because it would be to stop critically supporting the Mothers as the vanguard of the struggle against the assassinations and disappearances. But we have to be aware that we are raising as our own and without criticism the slogan of the Mothers and the Catholic Church, which is not achievable.

Eduardo: And they are going to abandon it sooner or later.

NM: That's right, and it's a pity we are not the ones who take this inevitable abandonment of the slogan "that they appear alive" to a much more revolutionary and unitary approach of judgment by the Mothers.

Eduardo: Sure. Because if they kept this slogan, let's say in a linear process and the dictatorship fell because the dead don't appear and cannot appear, it would be fantastic. But it is impossible because the mass movement neither supports it nor mobilises.

NM: Yes, but it is still dangerous because it is unrealistic because the dead can't show up alive. And I mean it very seriously. You cannot play with the slogans. But anyway, it's positive, I'm in favour, but let's all know it's a dangerous slogan. Much better and more objective is the [slogan of] "trial of the murderers by the Mothers". Historically, it could be imposed. The Mothers' current slogan, without judging whether it is correct or not, has all our support. You must say: "we are dead set with the slogan that the disappeared appear alive" because it is the slogan of the heroic and long-suffering Mothers of Plaza de Mayo. The responsibility belongs to them and the Argentines support them wholeheartedly. The opposite of what the bulletin and the leadership of the party say.

All this is quite important because I think you should have been the champions of unity of action saying: "what a shame that the movement is divided against repression around the disappeared, what a shame that the collateral of the Stalinists, etc., don't support the Mothers, whether or not their slogan is correct, what a pity that the CP split the support movement to the Mothers, vanguard in the struggle against repression because it disagrees with a slogan." We don't place conditions on progressive struggles to support them. To everything that is a struggle a Marxist never says: Either you are with my program and my slogan, or I don't support you. On the contrary, we support the struggle unconditionally, whether or not we like the slogan of struggle. We always support every progressive struggle, however confused, contradictory, reactionary, and unscientific its slogan and program may be but without committing to it. Not placing conditions doesn't mean tail-ending. The Colombians don't go to Tulio Cuevas¹⁴ and tell him "Declare yourself for Trotskyism as a condition

14 **Tulio Cuevas Romero** (1924-1999) was a Colombian trade union leader, congressman, teacher and journalist. Among his activities as a political and social leader, he was president of the Colombian Workers' Union (UTC), 1963-1983, General Secretary of the Inter-American Regional Labour Organisation (ORIT) and vice-president of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in 1981. In his political work, Cuevas Romero was a councillor for the city of Cali

for us to be in favour of the Labour Party you propose”. Let Tulio Cuevas remain a Catholic, a Jesuit, whatever he wants, let him remain against the dictatorship of the proletariat but he will have our support in the struggle for the Labour party, but only in that battle. This is why we support the struggle of the Mothers with their slogan of “appearance alive”.

But there is another aspect that shows our far-leftism and voluntarism. The attempt to build a collateral of the party. Let’s look at the quote: “To establish a superstructure linked to us in the democratic arena. This is the element we have lacked since we started our work. Something similar to the Human Rights Commission of the CP but linked to our party and its policy.” What I wonder is whether the conditions for it exist.

Eduardo: Well, that was the idea. Because we have no direct representation anywhere, everything is inside the organisms of others.

NM: Yes, but to create something similar to the CP, there must be objective conditions. If you pose an unachievable goal to the party, you discourage militants.

Eduardo: The comrades working on this say they do exist.

NM: Maybe, but we have to ask ourselves to what extent you say they do exist because of this orientation you give that the party can do everything, that you are the “big factor”, that you have a huge weight. If you were the fundamental factor of the demonstration of support for the Mothers, then do the organisation, but if you say it wasn’t so, that the movement and the concentration are of the Catholics, which is an independent process, as you correctly say in the paragraph quoted above from page 16, you can decide to be active within this objective movement, which is independent of you and the most progressive, to attempt to organise them into a new organism when you have sufficient strength.

Eduardo: But the idea is to have our body raise our slogans, independently of the Commission of Support to the Mothers and the Church.

NM: In the bulletin what you say about our superstructure arises from the picture you paint of the situation. On page 17, it says: “Without giving up on the proposal of our overall program, we guarantee the unity of action for the mobilisation around the point that made it possible. This characteristic is already a win that would remain as a distinctive feature of every mobilisation for democratic rights.”

Here you are saying that what happened on 30 [April] not only has you as the axis of all the mobilisation in Argentina but also that it has a line forwards. That we dominated the 30 [April], that we hit the CP with a mace and that this continues onwards. It is the characterisation of the bulletin.

P.: Around here it is said that we occupy the centre of the ring.

NM: And from the centre of the ring, you will form another organisation. It is what the reader understands.

Eduardo: Yes, it is so and in fact, we were finding that nobody responded to us on certain very important actions.

With the public announcement, the response was evident, everyone stuck to it. Then we said: let’s hit harder and let’s make our superstructure because here we have the seed. Now, in light of the murdered comrade, it was much more than the public announcement as a fact that impacted and hit hard. We hit against the wall because we held the press conference and no one wanted to launch the campaign. When we proposed to the Commission of Support to the Mothers that the concentration be not only for the disappeared but for human rights, and we proposed our program, the Commission replied “no!” So, we went and told the same to the representatives of Peace and Justice and they said “no!” So, we went and told the same thing to the CELS [Centre for Legal and Social Studies] branch and they responded “No, whatever the Mothers say!” Everybody bowed to

(1954-1956), deputy for the Valle del Cauca Assembly, representative to the Chamber of Deputies for Bogotá and Cundinamarca (1974-1986), vice-president of the National Directorate of the Conservative Party and president of the National Movement (1988-1990).

the Mothers. In other words, in fact, no one has responded to this front we want to do with them, to this body where we can express our politics.

NM: That's my suspicion. The definition is as follows: you acted well when the objective process took place. It is folly to separate ourselves from the objective process, the Commission of Support to the Mothers, Peace and Justice, the PC, and the liaison committee with CELS, to make our little league. Do it if it is a real organism, made up of activists other than you who are for human rights and by our militants. What is important is not this but the policy of unity of action of all sectors, including the league in the first place.

The barbecues for May Day

NM: Let's look at the issue of what you did for May Day. The bulletin says: "If we are clear about this (that we were the "only ones" who commemorate it), we can move on to statistics that also prove the above. Over 100 barbecues were held, with a turnout at the venues over 1,200 attendees. We need to point out that this is a total attendance out of the over 6,000 people we saw and invited. This means we spoke with all of them and explained the meaning of May Day. We believe that if we did not get them all to attend, it is because, as a reflection of the not yet massive resistance, the barbecues cannot be massive either" (p. 20). Then it clarifies that during the other activities of the month, some other 1,500 people met.

Then, there were 1,200 people besides the party militants. This is because "the resistance is not yet massive". What really happened? That the party didn't manage to attract absolutely nobody, not even the periphery who reads the newspaper. Only attended those who almost are militants already. This is the essential definition. Why? You cannot contradict yourselves with what you say every day because no one would understand you. Every day you say that in fact, you have almost 1,500 comrades who are steady supporters and candidates. You cannot forget this when analysing May Day. You have to say: the party has 1,500 comrades, new, and steady, who are about to enter the party; of them, about 1,200 were present on May Day.

The figures seem to show that no one other than a militant or an aspirant assisted. Why is this so? Apparently because no current of masses, even at the molecular level, exists to express politically its repudiation of the government. The explanation, as always, has to start from the facts. These are, after making a great effort, you only brought 1,200 non-militant comrades. We suspect they are aspirants or almost aspirants, not newly contacted comrades. Not even all the comrades who read the newspaper were there.

This is my characterisation. The bulletin says something different. It says that were the only ones, that it was extraordinary. This is a relative truth. All this always brings me back to the democratic thing. It is extraordinary to think that in a country where so many people have been killed, 1,500 brave people go to a demonstration to confront the government. But it has nothing to do with the demonstrations under Somoza after the assassination of Chamorro;¹⁵ they are light years apart. The same happens on May Day in Argentina. There is so much retreat, the resistance is so molecular that only our party made barbecues (which is a great merit) but failed to pull any sector of the workers' and mass movement. Besides, if you had managed to pull some sectors the barbecues would have been a mistake because it would have been appropriate to do some illegal demonstration. Everything is interconnected. If we made barbecues, it is because the retreat is very significant. At the time of the rise, when the previous dictatorship was already falling, we did public rallies in full clandestinity and carried out a conspiratorial work of art to prepare them. But it was because we already saw it in crisis, while the students and the mass movement were on the offensive. Today, if there was

¹⁵ **Pedro Chamorro** (1924-1978) was a Nicaraguan journalist, writer, businessman and politician who opposed the government of Luis Somoza and the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza; director of the newspaper *La Prensa*, he was assassinated. When the dictatorship was defeated in July 1979, the Sandinistas, who led the armed struggle and the revolution, formed a bourgeois government and brought in his wife, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, and another businessman, Luis Alfonso Robelo. In 1990 his wife ran for the presidency and won the election against the Sandinista Daniel Ortega, who could not be re-elected.

a rise in Argentina, we could hold public events of 10,000 or 20,000 people. Even the work of the democratic team could be used to do rallies with that attendance. As soon as you can, you must. And don't rule out the possibility of this happening in the short term. Maybe next year you can do it. But today everything is grey and petty, poor; not even the big periphery of the party will attend our little rallies. This is a reality. The party must prepare itself with all boldness to prepare mass rallies in future May Days or for democratic problems. But today, there are no objective conditions to go beyond what was done.

The trade union profile

NM: Let's now look at the trade union profile of your party. "The party is the one that organised all the strikes in the metalworkers' union, the one that is preparing the general strike of the union against the government. It is the Pink Slate, which knew how to provide leadership to the metalworkers who were fighting against the repeal of the law and today for wages. Each affiliate who agrees in their union to build a new leadership to sweep away the rather cadaverous bureaucracy and Stalinism, organising itself around every little fact and preparing it for greater confrontations; that is, who wants for his union a Pink Slate, is a comrade who approaches the party" (page 12). As a characterisation of our trade union principles that differentiate us sharply from other parties and tendencies, i.e., as a profile, this is false. This doesn't mean we are not in favour of all these tasks. We are also for a united workers' central and this doesn't differentiate us at all from almost all other tendencies of the Argentine workers' movement, which also want the same thing.

What characterises the party's policy in the trade union arena is not "organising strikes" or providing "leadership" to those who want to fight government measures. Rodriguez¹⁶ did the same in Ford and he is in the antipodes of the party. Nor is there a sharp distinction between the party wanting to "build a new leadership" or "organising itself around every little fact" that prepares it for greater confrontations. Vandor,¹⁷ before climbing to the leadership of the metalworkers' union, also fought for these slogans and he was already consistently anti-Trotskyist and bureaucratic. No, what sharply differentiates our party is that we want revolutionary unions in general, and today in Argentina we want trade union leaders to prepare the revolutionary general strike to overthrow the government and achieve democracy for the workers' and people's movement. How dangerous, false and opportunistic is the union profile! It is pure unionism, and economism doesn't link union life to politics.

National Trade Union issue

NM: Let's go to the national trade union issue. It says: "It is important that we highlight this to stay alert since we are quite far from these spheres and we can be caught off guard. Alert doesn't mean we have seen from below a strengthening of any sector of the bureaucracy. Its crisis is immense and the discredit in the eyes of the vast majority of the proletariat is growing. Of this, we should have no doubt but if we point out what we point out is because it is presented by reality itself and should serve us to adopt a policy, which unfortunately we don't have, committed as we are to take advantage of all the opportunities the resistance is giving us" (page 21).

Here, unconsciously, you are doing a good self-criticism. In plain language, you say, as you run like crazy everywhere to see in which strike you take part, you don't have a general trade union policy, "which unfortunately we don't have". This, which you have only seen in trade union work,

16 **Jose Rodriguez** (1935-2009) was an Argentine trade union bureaucrat who served for 36 years as General Secretary of SMATA, the autoworkers union and one of the largest trade unions in Argentina. He was also a national deputy for Peronism on two occasions and was head of the General Confederation of Labour in the 1990s..

17 **Augusto Timoteo Vandor** (1923-1969) was a trade union bureaucrat who led the recovery of the UOM (Metalworkers Union) which had been taken over after the military coup that overthrew Peron in 1955. In the 1960s he tried to promote a "Peronism without Perón" which was quickly aborted by the exiled leader in Madrid. A month after the Cordobazo, in June 1969, he was executed by a small armed Peronist group that years later would join the Montoneros.

I think is a general problem of your leadership. Specifically, in the trade union arena, it is true. The characterisations are partial, there is no in-depth union analysis; for example, what will we do in union elections? Eduardo from the ND says that we have to make slates similar to the Pink Slate of metalworkers everywhere as if making such slates depended on our will since “unfortunately we don’t have a policy”. There is a great contradiction here since, for Eduardo, author of the bulletin, we do have a general trade union policy; making Pink Slates, and a few pages later the bulletin says the opposite.

Let’s continue: “(...) let’s move to the other phenomenon which is qualitatively more important; the emergence of a layer of activists wherever there is a hint of resistance, of struggle against the bosses and the government itself. It is not a massive phenomenon, it happens where there is a struggle but to the beat of these arise inexperienced, ‘naïve’ activists, but they do arise. This is a new phenomenon and therefore decisive, these activists are the seed of a new leadership. Metalworkers are at the forefront of this process, undeniably, but it is a phenomenon that occurs wherever there have been struggles or they arise. In banking, in (...), etc., etc., this is the most important phenomenon. Again, it is not a general phenomenon and independent of the struggles. On the contrary, it is closely linked to the struggles (...). Only in isolated cases need coordinating bodies be raised. What we don’t rule out is that it will happen at an immediately higher stage. What now takes place almost exclusively is an organisation by factory, office, accompanied by a search for external solidarity, but as solidarity, rather than as a search for coordination” (page 21).

All this, although excessively economistic, seems correct to me but from there, you don’t draw conclusions. What is the qualitative difference? If here you say there is no coordination, that the fight is partial, but according to the description you make us of the metalworkers, the mobilisation is happening throughout the entire union...

Eduardo: That’s right. It is not by chance that there have been coordinating committees.

NM: Then, if that’s the case, there could be a Pink Slate in the metalworkers’ union. I mean, if that’s the case because I see the prospect that almost everywhere, right now, the bureaucracy will win. I see it as almost inevitable because there is a weak vanguard, without great leaders, and strong tendencies grassroots. That is, there is a general weakness of the resistance, it remains molecular, activists emerge in defensive struggles and many engage in partial struggle, disappear, and are lost sooner or later. I don’t think they are turning into a leadership for now. This is why strong union currents don’t emerge; this is why there are no axes. The current characteristic of the Argentine proletariat is that it lacks an axis or centralisation, neither for the resistance nor to promote a new leadership. There is no one to agglutinate, there is nothing like the workers’ groupings of 1956, 1957, 1958 or as the “62”¹⁸ were in Argentina. And this is of decisive importance for the party and it has to be clearly stated, to avoid confusion. The truth is that only the party, consciously and with its militants, is the one that agglutinates and leads, with exceptions, more or less important struggles, such as metalworkers. But there are a few struggles and these are lost.

Eduardo: Anti-bureaucratic tendencies that postulate as leadership do begin to emerge by sector.

NM: If it is so, much better. We have to study it but with the warnings we have made, trying to get down to earth. This is why I criticise that there is no union analysis as a whole. If we had one, we might say, “everybody to metalworkers now; nothing happens anywhere else”. Or, everywhere it is even, as in metalworkers, and then we don’t give as much importance to metalworkers and we focus on all the important unions, to organise their opposition slates so that they can take over the union’s leadership. Or it may be, as I have the impression that it is, that there are hardly any strong anti-bureaucratic union currents anywhere and, in this case, we are making an ugly mistake. Everything would seem to show this is the case. Whatever the analysis and the line, my most important criticism

18 The “62 Organisations” led the struggle of the Peronist workers to recover the unions and the CGT that had been taken over by the dictatorship that overthrew Peron in 1955. Later they transformed themselves into a grouping of the bureaucratic leadership of the CGT and Peronist trade unionism.

is that we have not done the analysis, which was an express decision of the CC, and therefore we remain in uncertainty.

Let's move on to another problem within the same context: "That is, what we say is not to encourage a pure trade union work but to show how starting from the concrete problems of wages and unemployment, we can help the organisation of the proletariat, explicitly how we can help to the formation of a new leadership and at the same time we are favouring the creation of the Party of the Resistance with the incorporation of these elements" (page 21).

This is a rather important problem and that's why I left it for last. Everything you read in that quote could be wrong. I don't think it necessarily goes from union-specific to political-abstract. I could you can go from the political to the union.

In the long history of the world workers' movement, both the variants mentioned in the bulletin and the other have taken place. In the process of formation of the working class as a class for itself, as a political class, there have been two historical processes. One that organises itself from the factory to the union, and afterwards from there to the understanding of political independence. This happened with the British working class and what happened again after the 1955 coup in Argentina. These are exceptional cases. What took place in almost all the European working class and also in Argentina at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present was that a socialist or anarchist party (and may anarchists forgive me for calling them a party) made propaganda and told the workers: "You have to understand that we are exploited, that there are two classes and that we must defeat the capitalist government and impose a workers' government that suppress exploitation to achieve socialism, and this is why you have to enter the party, to fight against exploitation, against the government, for a workers' government and socialism." From these parties, strengthened with these political objectives, the unions were organised.

There have been many cases in which the party and the political objectives were first and the unions followed, made by the party. It has also happened that they marched together. In Argentina, a similar or combined process could happen again: first, the strengthening of political resistance to the government and the party, and then the reorganisation of the trade unions, and the new leadership. There may also be a single process that combines the political with the trade union.

The bulletin says: "Starting from the concrete problems of wages and unemployment, we can help the organisation of the proletariat." I would say today, until big struggles for wages or unemployment arise, the following: "Starting from the hatred of the government, from the urgent and general need to confront and liquidate it, let us strengthen the party and through these two political channels, the resistance and strengthening the party, let us move to the essential, fundamental task of the revolutionary reorganisation of the workers' unions."

Is it clear? The bulletin inexorably gives us a process from the union to the political, which is very possible that it will happen but today is not so and we are not sure it will be so. Today our main task is to confront and denounce the government and gain influence and militants to take part in the process of resistance to the government until overturning it. The main task of the party is not to detect disputes over wages or unemployment but to politically denounce the military government and take part in this molecular process of workers' and popular resistance against the government, which is multifaceted but essentially political because it goes against the government, to achieve a great political goal, democracy in the country. All other struggles are subordinated to this one, which today is the most concrete because it is the most general. Time will tell how this political struggle and this partisan strengthening will be combined with this colossal task, the union restructuring. Today, what is fundamental is political, like mass resistance and party strengthening.

The resistance

NM: What is resistance in general and what is resistance in particular in Argentina? For us, resistance is a kind of political, social and economic guerrilla warfare, not military. Guerrilla warfare

emerged as the only form of armed defence against a much more powerful and triumphant enemy. That's why it hits or fights at a given place and moment and then runs and hides. The resistance, instead of being armed, is political, trade union, social, and cultural but like the guerrilla, taken as a whole, it battles here and there to move to other sectors of struggle: factory, rail workers, democratic, Ford, defence of education, student, a multitude of factories and jumping from one to another. There is a plethora of defensive struggles, desperate in the face of the advance of the triumphant power. Instead of being military, this "guerrilla" is made by the defenceless masses but, just as in guerrilla warfare, it is defensive, molecular. As soon as the mass movement has an axis, the counter-offensive will begin. Something similar happens in the military arena, when the guerrilla moves to positional warfare, of army against army. At that moment the guerrilla moves from defensive to offensive, seeking military triumph. This is why I believe I have made a mistake and misled other comrades when I used as synonyms "resistance" and "molecular and slow rise". We must say resistance, which means, by definition, defensive, not of a rise or counter-offensive, although we could say "rise of the resistance".

Nowadays, it is a resistance, a guerrilla of all levels of the workers' and popular movement, without leadership. But as with every comparison or analogy, it has a limit; the difference with the guerrillas we know today is that there is no centralised leadership of this social guerrilla. It resembles the spontaneous guerrillas that have taken place in the last century like the montoneras¹⁹ or the classic Spanish guerrilla under French occupation. That's why it is molecular, weak, even when there is a factory occupation because it is not the whole proletariat or the people that are fighting, rather there are outbreaks, desperate factory occupations, on the defensive.

The only conscious leadership that exists at present, but that has not objectively connected with all the resistance, is our party. There is this objective process of social guerrilla or resistance and subjective of our party. This doesn't mean that tomorrow there will not be other subjective factors that will be part of the same resistance. They will be the CGT or organisations similar to the "62 Organisations", Coordinating Committees, and other parties that emerge from the resistance or join it.

I don't know how this subjective process will unfold. Nor do I know how the objective leap from resistance to counter-offensive will take place. This objective process of resistance will necessarily go through stages and will leap a workers' and popular insurrection, to an "Argentinazo". When? I don't know but historically it is almost inevitable this will happen.

I think resistance is still weak. We shouldn't deceive ourselves with the metalworkers, what happens to us with the democratic team might happen tomorrow with metalworkers. Hence, we have to arm the party with the conviction we are the only ones who are subjectively today with the resistance, and therefore we are the subjective centre of it but not the objective centre. To become so, to transform ourselves into the undisputed leadership of the resistance, we must organise and strengthen the party. It is an uneven process. It's not that the party must be linked at all times and inexorably to all resistance and to everything that happens, although linking is a must. No, the party must subjectively reflect this generalised objective process of resistance, giving and propagandising its political program: ¡Down with the dictatorship! General strike to face it! Constituent Assembly!

And how will you explain it and achieve it? With correct analyses, a well-aimed organisational line, and essentially a newspaper that is the expression of the resistance and confrontation with the government until its revolutionary defeat. This doesn't mean the party can be everywhere where there is resistance. We must insist that we are a subjective factor, not objective. Bringing it down to earth, this means that precisely because resistance is molecular, it needs a centre and, at present, that centre is us (in the subjective sense, I repeat). This is why the organisational form by neighbourhoods, and that's also why the great task of the newspaper distribution. Many say: that distributing the newspaper in a neighbourhood may reach the grocer and not a union activist. The mere fact that the grocer receives it, reads it, and distributes it transforms him into a far more important activist

¹⁹ **Montoneras** are irregular military formations generally made up of individuals from the same locality who lend their armed support to a particular cause or leader. They initially emerged during the war of independence against Spain, and played an important role in the Argentine Civil War during the 19th century.

than a loose union activist, as the one described in the bulletin, who is erratic. And if he is not with us, he has to be that way, erratic, because he has no axes, he has no organisation.

The objective process and the party have not yet merged and it is very difficult for them to merge in the immediate future. Almost certainly, there will be intermediate organisms before they merge. Possibly, it will be the subjective factors I pointed out a moment ago, something new, similar to the “62”, or CGT, or coordinating committees, or new parties. The party will have to take into account these new organisms, to use or defeat them as part of its policy to become the leadership of the resistance. But to achieve this, it must take into account the proportions and the new phenomena. If we already say we will succeed, we will not achieve it. It is a very complicated process, precisely because it is very hard and has molecular resistance.

In Colombia, it is also possible that a process may also take place that leads the party to become an undisputed leader because the others are useless. Tulio Cuevas has nothing either. Let us not deceive ourselves. When the great workers and popular struggles arrive, we shall see. But maybe not. Let's see what mediations take place. The same thing happens to our party. It may only become a leadership as a big socialist party controlled by us, as a Labour party that doesn't cover the whole workers' movement but a 20 or 25 per cent influenced by you. But union leaders or Socialist or Labour parties not controlled by us may also emerge. It would be a new barrier or a new springboard in our transformation into the leadership of the workers' movement. Whether one variant or the other takes place will depend on objective reality and our political capacity.

All this is the music of the future. The great task is the newspaper and to strengthen the party in the resistance. For the moment, this means that a party activist, a mere newspaper deliverer, is more than a trade union activist who wants nothing to do with the party and the newspaper.

It is time to make a new theoretical refinement. We have not pointed out that the counter-revolutionary character of the stage demands an essentially propagandistic activity, taking this expression in its broadest sense, that is, in the sense of propagandising our ideas and slogans through written or oral words, and not through actions. But this theoretical refinement must be relativised by the need to promote and defend the actions of the resistance and by the possibility of agitation against the government and its measures. The necessary and difficult combination of propaganda, agitation, and action of the party activity is determined by the atypical character of the counter-revolutionary stage. If there were no resistance, if the defeat of the workers' and mass movements were total and historical, the party should limit itself to propaganda in the narrow sense of the word, “giving many ideas to very few comrades”, through magazines, pamphlets, books, courses, and conferences. But this is not the case and this is why we promote and support the actions of the resistance and we throw fliers. But large-scale propaganda, while not being the only activity, is the primary one, we insist, because of the character of the stage. This need to promote resistance and to make propaganda as a fundamental task is synthesised in the fact that the main task is to publish the newspaper and not books, pamphlets or magazines (although this is very important). Precisely because of the very character of the stage, the central propaganda goal essentially aims to win readers and, through this, militants and sympathisers to develop and strengthen the party as the supreme task. This essentially propagandistic character of our activity, until the stage begins to change, explains the geographical organisation by neighbourhoods, zones and regions that we intend to give to the party. It is the most suited to propaganda and the least apt for the future offensive actions of the working class.

We are overestimating ourselves

NM: All your mistakes have a common theme: overestimating the influence of the party and the resistance. This is seen in all the references to the party in the bulletin and the seven points of the profile. All this is about showing that we are making progress, which to some extent is justified to counter the tendency to scepticism, but we must keep due proportions. For example, that the metallurgical factories have stopped is very positive but as long as we immediately say that only a

tiny minority of metalworkers stopped in the whole country. We must achieve a balance, giving the fairest measure as much as possible.

The whole bulletin is the opposite. Ours is almost absolute everywhere. And it manifests itself in all aspects of party life. Like what you say about the railway comrade who died in a work accident: “Rudy was really an exceptional being”. In all fields and at all times Marxism seeks and tells the truth. Was Rudy truly exceptional? Remember my speech at the funeral of the comrades murdered in Pacheco in 1974.²⁰ I refused to make a panegyric and use adjectives. I simply said the truth, that they were good rank-and-file comrades.

Eduardo: What we published is a letter from the comrade who recruited him. Among us, we discussed whether to publish it or not.

NM: What I say is simple. Was he really exceptional or extraordinary? If so, we say it. Wasn't he? Then we don't say it. Otherwise, we do the party a disservice. There must be about 500 comrades like him, who are normal, not exceptional. The whole bulletin is the same; it's made with a pump instead of a typewriter. This article runs counter to party tradition, such as the magnificent report of Marcela [Silvia Díaz] at the funeral of Arturo [Gomez] which was appreciated so well in the party because she did a Marxist analysis of Arturo's personality. This is noticeable in the bulletin itself, where the only thing sober is the few lines recalling a new anniversary of Arturo's death.

In my opinion, this overestimating is present in the objective characterisation of the resistance. It may still be very weak. Politics must obey this characterisation. If there is a great resistance the slogan “Everybody to Plaza de Mayo!” is justified for the demonstration of the Commissions of Support to the Mothers. If we wanted a mass mobilisation, then that was the great task of the party. We call all the militants and sympathisers and tell them the great task is to sell the newspaper with the call and to mobilise everyone to Plaza de Mayo.

The general line is that, not the little problem of the factory. Then you have to work yourself to death to take 10,000 or 15,000 to Plaza de Mayo. It seems to me that there were not only no conditions and what was done was right — to work only on the vanguard that fights for human rights and against repression because the resistance at the general, political level is very weak. However, the political line of the party was not serious because there was no analysis of reality or coherent policy. You have erred in the newspaper with the call “Everybody to Plaza de Mayo!” You were right by chance, by sheer luck, in the activity by limiting it to the “democratic” comrades. This confuses the party. Everything is incoherent; nobody knows well what characterisation you have of the resistance, or what policy you had for the demonstration.

Once again, the question of method

NM: All this is very dangerous because there is empiricism and you don't move by analysis and by precise and serious lines but by jumping, changing and confusing, week by week, and from one page to another of the bulletin or the newspaper, what we resolve and say.

This issue of the rhythm of the resistance is a crucial problem. I am afraid of two hypotheses in this respect because I have no elements, facts seriously investigated and provided by you, to pronounce myself. For example, I don't know whether molecular resistance essentially happens everywhere or mainly in the trade unions and factory commissions. Perhaps, because it is very slow, you don't detect the changes in the union and factory organisation, its dynamics and its current reality. My advice for the neighbourhood organisation is based on the presumption that, for now, the unions, not even in a larval form, are the axis of resistance. But this adventurous analysis, I make it based on very few indications and facts.

I am millimetres away from committing a methodological crime in pronouncing myself with so few elements but I am forced to do so because there is no time to lose and you bring me almost nothing for the study. I point this out to open the discussion and you have to take it with a grain of salt because I'm not sure of anything. I also say that if we lose the probable bus of the trade unions as the only present organising centre of the resistance, we would make a serious mistake.

²⁰ See *Speech on Pacheco's Massacre* in nahuelmoreno.org.

All comrades should discuss the current role of unions and the role they will likely have within a year. I insist I don't get the impression today they are the main organiser of the resistance. There are few exceptions; some unions resist in their own way, which confirms the molecular character of the resistance. They are the union molecules of resistance, just as there are for neighbourhoods, students, intellectuals, bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ones, with none predominating. But I could be wrong and such a mistake would favour a very dangerous deviation, that of the neighbourhoods. Besides, there is the danger we forget that the recovery and reorganisation of the internal committees, industry unions, and the single CGT are our main goals. We will not rest until we achieve them. In this sense, we continue, as always, the fight against unemployment, and low wages, and for the recovery of the entire union organisation.

Here I would like to pause to point out that two serious dangers arise from my speech, in my eagerness to encourage you about the current character of the stage and how essential the propaganda tasks are. These dangers are: first, that we abandon the union-factory work and that we don't study its true significance in the resistance, which may still be the centre of it. Second, we forget that as important as the slogan of "Down with the government!" is the recovery of the trade union movement with all the other slogans that define this struggle. "Stop the take-overs!", "For factory commissions, single and independent unions and for a single CGT!", etc.

Herein lies the key question, that of the method and the regime of the leadership and, therefore, of the whole party. First of all, we have to be objective but we know that objectivity is of little or no use if we stop there. Starting from the strictest accuracy of the facts (1,200 to the barbecues, 1,500 to Plaza de Mayo) we must do the Marxist, dynamic analysis. That is, to specify in which direction a phenomenon of reality is going or moving. The barbecues and the demonstration were poor regarding the needs of the struggle, of the confrontation with the government, but superior to what it was previously; it was progress. I ask: Is the resistance getting stronger, even though it is still weak and molecular? Does it deepen and extend?

Only from this careful analysis can we draw a political line and slogans. If it remains weak, slow, molecular and widespread, the only centralised general task is to strengthen the party, the main task is to place the newspaper, the organisation is by neighbourhood and the big slogans are ultra-propagandistic, not for action. They are: Down with the government! For democracy in the country! For a Constituent Assembly! For the preparation of the general insurrectional strike to overthrow the government! Plus, everything we have already said is much more specific, and immediate, which doesn't mean more achievable (only time will tell): Against unemployment! For the recovery of the trade union movement!

Our immediate tasks

NM: If all the above slogans are ultra-propagandistic or for molecular, biased action, this means there is nothing other than one general and immediate action feasible — strengthening the party.

You must tell the comrades: let's strengthen the party, let's see who is coming towards us, to win them. Are the Stalinists or the bureaucracy putting up a fight? Let's see if we join them since we are the champions of the unity of all who show signs of a fight against the government, even if it is tiny. Knowing they are opportunists, let's see whether we take a step to push them into the struggle. This tactic is already the norm on human rights but everywhere else you have to see how you can bring everyone, without sectarianism, to the struggle against the government.

The great task is to see how many newspapers you sell and then how many militants you are recruiting because our organisation is the only one of national character that exists today in the struggle against the government. This is the way to be in all the disputes — without making crazy efforts to be everywhere at the same time — to concentrate efforts, given the anger that exists, have cells in all districts of the country, reach 10,000 militants and sympathisers and sell 20,000 newspapers. If we achieve that, then we will be linked to all disputes, since there will be none without our presence.

This doesn't mean you don't try to contact, right now, all the factory disputes. But with specialised teams, otherwise, we confuse the comrades who should specialise in selling the newspaper and in recruitment. At this stage, you have to tell the comrades they should get used to reading (and for that, you have to provide them with books), do analysis, learn Marxism, sell many newspapers and recruit militants. They have to do propaganda and more propaganda.

You have to put an end to hysteria and crazy militancy because we don't lose much if the Ford strike is lost. All of them are lost because the retreat continues and there is only resistance. You lose in Ford and you fight in another factory, and then you lose in that and another and another, and the only thing remaining is the molecular resistance and the party. It is about strengthening as much as you can, at least until the first and truly great victories come. To put it schematically, between recruiting 40 young people and participating in the Ford strike, today it is now preferable to recruit 40 young people.

This doesn't mean, and for this, you are a great party, that you don't take part in the Ford strike. How do we do it? We form a cell of the best unionists to participate in all the strikes of an area. Meanwhile, the majority of the comrades continue placing the newspaper and winning sympathisers and militants. At this stage the party as a whole has, as a fundamental task, to sell newspapers and recruit, as the only way to educate the vanguard that leads the resistance. For how long? Until real objective currents emerge, be they union or political, great struggles begin to transform the resistance into a counter-offensive. That would be the moment of the change of line and orientation.

Today I don't see those currents or those objective triumphs. Even currents of opposition to the discredited union bureaucracy aren't emerging in the most important guilds and unions. This is my impression although perhaps I am too pessimistic.

Everyone must be socially and geographically placed. I think there is a social problem in the apparatus. Some comrades have been many years as professionals and then they lose the sense of reality, they become lumpenised. I believe we must act very strongly to change this situation. Most of the professionals or former professionals have to get jobs in places with possibilities of developing the party. And you have to see how you can root the leadership itself to see if you can get it to be more consistent, to do what they vote and think and that they consult 20 times before changing. We have to act like a doctor would: nothing is done without a prior analysis.

You don't read the classics. The members of the Secretariat are ignorant of Marxism but they dictate and write fundamental documents on their own. Whoever prescribes without studying is not a doctor but a quack and you do quackery. Every advance has to be done with caution, studying the classics and reality. We need to attach fundamental importance to the resolutions voted by the party, strictly adhering to them. We have to religiously respect the resolutions, constantly saying "Congress voted this, the CC voted such another thing, such a question becomes enriched thus", and apply it religiously.

This doesn't mean you will not advance. If you come up with an idea, you think it, discuss it, approve it or reject it. It is a slow procedure but slowness is a characteristic of Bolshevism. I always insist that a Bolshevik party is slow and it is strong when it makes a resolution. It is different from a petty-bourgeois party, whose characteristics are speed, impressionism, the jumping from one position to another. We are the opposite: we take time because we study, we discuss, and when we make a decision, we are consistent with it because it results from a serious study. If we act seriously the party gains confidence. Your empirical method of incoherent jumps in everything has generated mistrust. And an even more serious phenomenon, which has spread to the whole party, no one gives importance to what is voted, what is said, and there is no religion of the analysis and the voted line, of discussion previous to all resolutions.

The party has lost its traditional custom of having serious and documented discussions. The habit of discussing politics and drawing lines in a fraternal and systematic manner among all comrades no longer exists. All this has been lost because you are in an ocean of confusion. Nobody knows what it is about and with what regime and method to face reality.

The leadership must urgently set aside its empiricism and hysteria, its lack of discussion and serious and fraternal analyses, so the whole party may follow its example. I do not doubt that this will happen.